

REPORT NO. 79
HISTORICAL SECTION (G.S.)
ARMY HEADQUARTERS

30 Jan 59

SAINT-PIERRE-ET-MIQUELON DURING
THE SECOND WORLD WAR
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ADDENDUM TO
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1. The recent publication of Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1941, Volume II Europe (Washington, 1959) makes public a selection of non-controversial State Department documents dealing with the crisis precipitated by the occupation of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon (pages 540-570). From the Canadian point of view, however, this material merely provides verification and amplification of the account already produced in Report No. 79. But the existing references number 84, 85 and 89 should be changed so that they now refer to pages 540, 541 and 542 of the above mentioned volume.
2. Apparently the above Canadian plan for peaceful supervision of the wireless station on Saint-Pierre (see paras 58-60) did prompt a member of the State Department to suggest that sufficient economic pressure might be exerted to force acquiescence by the colony's pro-Vichy administrator (see pages 540-545). The American Consul's dispatch of 26 Dec 41 describing the coup d'état and his interviews with Admiral Muselier occupies four pages (544-557) and is very similar to the dispatch sent by Mr. Eberts to Ottawa on the same date (see paras 66 and 76). Admiral Muselier's distrust of an distatste for General de gaulle seems to have been expressed more forcibly to the United States Consul, who was cautioned against permitting this information being passed along to London.

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1. Following the fall of France in June 1940, the status of the French colony of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon became a matter of some importance. This Report traces the action subsequently suggested and/or taken by the interested parties. The story is told from the Canadian point of view, with just enough background material provided to make understandable the actions of the British, Vichy and American Governments and the Free French Movement.

(i) Geographical and Historical Setting

2. The archipelago of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon is all that remains of once considerable French possessions in North America. It comprises a group of nine small islands lying about 10 miles west and south-west of Point Crewe the south coast of Newfoundland, and is commonly called "St. Pierre and Miquelon" by the English-speaking peoples. For the sake of simplicity, therefore, this nomenclature will be used. Since 1783 Grande Miquelon and Petite Miquelon (or Langlade) have been joined by a shingle bank five and a half miles long, and thus are really one island with an area of 83 square miles. Three miles distant, across a channel known as La Baie, is St.Pierre: with an area of about 10 square miles, it is five miles long and

three and a half miles wide. The much smaller Ile aux Chiens is the only other of the islands which is inhabitable and of economic value. All present a bare and rocky appearance: a thin surface of peat covers the rocks in many parts, while the valleys are filled with lakes or peat mosses; boulders are scattered everywhere. The tops of the hills on Miquelon are long and flat, while in St. Pierre the outline is more irregular. The coasts are generally steep and high, except on the north-east side of Petite Miquelon. Navigation is difficult and landing is often dangerous, with St. Pierre having the only really good harbour. The severity of the climate is due more to polar currents and winds than to geographical position. The heat of summer rarely rises above 72 degrees. During the period April to November there is a rainfall of 40 to 47 inches. Winters are long, rather than rigorous; snow lasts from November to April, though the thermometer seldom falls to four degrees Fahrenheit. Although the harbour of St. Pierre has not been blocked since 1874, navigation around the islands is hindered by field ice during February and March. On an average there are 160 days of fog in the year, with June and July being the worst months and August and September the best.

3. The Treaty of Paris of 1763 provided that St. Pierre and Miquelon should remain in French hands to serve as a shelter for fishermen, but the Islands were retaken by the British during the course of each succeeding war and have been permanently occupied by French settlers only since 1814. The several treaties indicated, however, that the rights of sovereignty did not extend to the right a fortified base so as to convert them into an object of jealousy between the United Kingdom and France. Without agricultural resources, mineral wealth, or independent industrial activity, the colony lived by its cod fishery and owed not merely its

importance but its very commercial existence to the accident of nature which created a safe roadstead and harbour in proximity to the prolific fisheries of the Newfoundland Banks.

4. During the early years of the 20th Century, longshore fishing began to increase in popularity among the inhabitants and there was a corresponding decline in the size of the local fleet engaged in deep-sea fishing on the Banks. On the other hand, the numbers of vessels from France tended to increase, justifying for a time the continued existence of St. Pierre as a port of call. But the colony was in a state of decline when the United States of America embraced “Prohibition” in 1920. From the until 1933 St. Pierre basked in the prosperity brought by the bootlegger. Although a certain amount of smuggling continued to be aimed at Newfoundland and the Maritime Provinces of Canada, by 1940 the colony’s economy was once again in an unhealthy state and its annual deficit was being made good by a subsidy from France.

5. At that time the colony was governed by an Administrator, M. Gilbert de Bournat, assisted by a consultative council of administration and by municipal councils. De Bournat took direction from Admiral Georges Robert, who was French High Commissioner in the Antilles and ordinarily resident in Martinique. According to a 1940 census the population of St. Pierre numbered 3396 persons, while there were a further 520 on Miquelon and 259 on Ile aux Chiens (1).

(ii) France and the Free World, 1940-1941

6, The defeat of the French armies was followed by the conclusion of an Armistice with Germany on 22 Jun 40 and one with Italy two days later. A dispirited people were only too

ready to accept the authority of a French government headed by Marshal Philippe Pétain, the elderly hero of Verdun and a symbol of better days. This regime soon established itself at Vichy. Although the first reaction in the colonial empire was refusal to accept defeat, the official class in all the major colonies threw in their lot with the Pétain régime; indeed, their sense of hierarchic subordination and tradition of obedience made any other course impossible. Similarly, most officers of the armed forces considered that their oath of allegiance bound them to Vichy (2). Yet Vichy never achieved political coherence. According to Professor Alfred Cobban:

Its history is not the history of a government by Pétain, or by anyone else, but of the intrigues and struggles of competing factions, fighting for power in what was left to them of France, but confined and restrained on all sides by the conditions of a world at war and the dictates of the Germans (3).

Of all the illusions which flourished at Vichy the greatest was the belief that France would be left alone to pursue its new domestic policies peacefully while the rest of the world continued to fight. What it hoped to turn into an oasis of peace proved to be simply a no man's land in the battle-front. The escape into reality was to prove an impossibility (4).

While there was no section within the administration contemplating the possibility of a return to the alliance with the United Kingdom, a powerful faction, headed by Pierre Laval, did actively desire closer relations with the Germans.

7. On the other hand, fearing the secession of North Africa to the British, the Germans were anxious not to push the French too far or too quickly. Therefore Hitler was prepared to encourage France to defend her own colonies, and permit her to retain the means of doing so, despite Italian demands for the disarmament of French North Africa (5).

8. The British Government was forced to adopt a cautious role and to avoid any act which might bring Vichy into the war on the side of Germany. Thus British policy was merely to exercise economic pressure on the colonies which adhered to Vichy and promise assistance, but only against naval attack, to those which might reject the rule of Marshal Pétain (6). Although diplomatic relations were ended following the attack on the French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir and nearby Oran on 3 Jul, all links were not entirely severed. Contacts were established through the British and French Ambassadors at Madrid and on 10 Nov Prime Minister Churchill wrote General de Gaulle: “We are trying to arrive at some modus vivendi with Vichy which will minimise the risk of incidents and will enable favourable forces in France to develop”. He later wrote in Their Finest Hour:

I was very glad when at the end of the year the United States sent an Ambassador to Vichy of so much influence and character as Admiral Leahy, who was himself so close to the President. I repeatedly encouraged Mr. Mackenzie King to keep his representative, the skilful and accomplished M. Dupuy, at Vichy. Here at least was a window upon a courtyard to which we had no other access (7).

9. Although the Canadian Legation had been withdrawn from Paris to London during the critical days of the Battle of France, it continued in being and there was no diplomatic obstacle to its Charge d'Affaires, Mr Pierre Dupuy, visiting Vichy on 20 Aug to investigate the interests of Canadians who were unable to leave France. He returned to London only on 20 Dec 40. Subsequent visits were made to Vichy during January-March and August-September 1941. While in London, Mr Dupuy was in frequent communications with the various departments of the British Government, to whom information regarding developments in France was made available (8).

10. Meanwhile, in the face of mounting criticism, the French Legation remained undisturbed in Ottawa. The Conservative Party urged that the British lead should be followed, and diplomatic relations with Vichy discontinued. The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation objected to recognition being accorded a régime that seemed so obviously fascist(9). Thus Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King was led to state on 6 Aug 40, in answer to questions raised in the House of Commons, that:

...our position has been to permit the minister who has come to Canada from France to remain. He understands that the situation is a delicate one and that he is here with a view of assisting our government to meet questions as they arise rather than to do anything directly or indirectly which would serve to embarrass the government. The position as far as our relationship with France is concerned is well known and understood in the United Kingdom. I believe we are helping to meet the desire of the United Kingdom

government in not severing diplomatic relations to the extent of asking the present minister to retire. I believe a similar attitude is being taken on the part of South Africa towards its representative from France. Certainly as between this country and the French people there has always been the closest and friendliest kind of relationship. France has been the ally of the United Kingdom more than once and we certainly hope that the day will come when relations will be restored to the old normal happy state that has existed in past years. In the interval if there is anything we can do to further that end, and avoid, as I have said, any new issue arising, I think it should be done. And it is on that basis that the relationship is being maintained as it is at the present time (10).

Although there were no pronouncements by political leaders from within the province of Quebec, the French-speaking press was friendly disposed towards the Pétain Government because of its strong clerical bias. Yet, at the same time, there was no marked antagonism towards the Free French Movement.

11. It has been suggested that General Charles de Gaulle's brief tenure of office in the Reynaud Cabinet, before escaping by air to England, caused this self-appointed leader of the Free French Movement to regard himself henceforth as a politician rather than a soldier – a psychological point that initially was not realized by British political and military leaders. "Their prime object," according to Sir Desmond Morton, 'was doubtless to use de Gaulle as a military rallying-point for any elements of the French army and air force who might elect to fight on and so swell the number of fighting men available to the Allies'" (11). Although they were not to be used against France, it was agreed that the forces being organized were, as far as

possible, to bear an entirely French character, particularly as regards language, discipline, promotion and administration. Even though Vice-Admiral Emile Henri Muselier, who had placed his ships and resources at the disposal of the Royal Navy in June, was a good deal senior in the French service hierarchy, the Admiralty proposed to concert naval arrangements with General de Gaulle. “The admiral’s acceptance of the provision appeared to show that he regarded de Gaulle as the supreme commander of the Free French navy as well as of the army; this weakened his position if, as indeed occurred later, he should wish to assert his original claim to independence” (12). Free French forces might be placed at the disposal of British commanders anywhere by General de Gaulle, who agreed to accept British direction of the higher conduct of the war.

12. From the outset there had been agreement on the importance of acquiring French colonial territory. Grand strategy pointed to North Africa, but this proved too difficult for de Gaulle’s forces to attempt, in view of the attitude of the local administration and armed forces. Neither in Madagascar nor French Guiana, nor the Antilles, nor St. Pierre and Miquelon, was there any overt demand to join the Movement; in any case, these colonies, together with the Indian possessions and islands in the Pacific, were too far from the scene to be of first concern. During September 1940 a joint Anglo-Free French expedition against Dakar failed and French West Africa held to Vichy. Fortunately, the Cameroons and Equatorial Africa were won over, as a result of successful coups d’état. Although the British Government subsequently agreed to treat with the Council for the Defence of the French Empire, whose formation de Gaulle proclaimed from Brazzaville on 27 Oct, it was made clear that no views would be expressed on any constitutional or juridical considerations which might be raised in any of his manifestoes or

speeches. For, willingly or unwillingly, the majority of Frenchmen were accepting the rule of Vichy. Furthermore, unlike the Governments-in-Exile in London, all of whom had been elected at one time or another by the people they claimed to represent, there existed no means whereby the policies of General de Gaulle could obtain the approval of any sort of free popular vote (13).

13. Although the benevolently neutral United States of America was being guided by a very astute statesman and practical politician during the critical weeks and months of 1940, President Roosevelt's advisers remained obsessed with the belief that the British would be defeated. Thus, while the President soon correctly diagnosed the British Isle as being America's first line of defence, principal subordinates such as Admiral Harold R. Stark, General George C. Marshall and Secretary of State Cordell Hull continued to worry about the disposition of the British and French Navies – since the United States Navy necessarily was concentrated in the Pacific – and to place unusual emphasis on the attitude adopted by the Pétain Government at Vichy (14). In regard to this last, Mr Hull's policy had four main objects:

- (a) to see that the French fleet was not turned over to Hitler;
- (b) to see that the Axis did not get possession or control of French bases in Africa or in the Western Hemisphere;
- (c) to see that the Vichy Government did not go beyond the terms of the armistice toward active collaboration with Hitler;

- (d) to restore a degree of friendship
between France and Britain(15).

14. Obviously, the pursuit of these objects was not compatible with recognition of the Free French Movement. Reports from France continued to rate General de Gaulle's following there as being low. Even though these undoubtedly were based on the naturally closer contacts that Americans had with the world of officialdom and high society than with the great bulk of the people, there was the obvious fact that Vichy represented effective French power in France and North Africa. Moreover, the intense pressure brought to bear on the Roosevelt Administration by Free French sympathizers and propagandists in the United States, and their bitter attacks on American foreign policy strengthened the official prejudice against General de Gaulle and a determination to have as little as possible to do with his Movement.

15. Although the Monroe Doctrine was to have no standing in International Law until the Senate ratified the Convention of Habana of 30 Jul 40, The State Department's policy was based on the views expressed by President James Monroe in his message to Congress of 2 Dec 1823. As early as 3 Jun 40 a resolution of this nature was introduced into both Houses of Congress. On 17 Jun, the day that it was approved by the Senate, Germany and Italy were informed that the United States would not recognize any transfer and would not acquiesce in any attempt to transfer, any geographic region of the Western Hemisphere from one non-American Power to another non-American Power. The United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands were informed in the same sense(16). On 21 Jul the foreign ministers of the American Republics met at Habana. Before concluding their meetings on 30 Jul, they approved

an Act of Habana which would go into force immediately and a Convention which would have to be ratified by two-thirds of the participating nations. As events developed, the Act of Habana never had to be applied, but it may have served as a deterrent to would-be aggressors. It authorized an emergency administrative committee to assume the administration of any European colony which might be attacked or threatened. Should there not be time to convene this committee, any republic, acting by itself or with other republics, could act in the manner required by its own defence or that of the continent(17).

(iii) Initial Canadian Steps

16. Having been deterred during April 1940 from despatching Force "X" to protect Greenland* against possible German aggression, the Canadian Government may have been hesitant to tangle so soon again with the U.S. State Department, over so small an issue as St. Pierre and Miquelon and at a time when survival might depend upon material assistance from the United States. Although requests for Canadian-American staff talks on the subject of North American defence had been greeted without enthusiasm in Washington, the United States Minister in Ottawa was directed to find out exactly what the Canadians wished to discuss and then report upon it in person(18). Therefore, on 29 Jun the Hon. Jay Pierpont Moffat spent an hour discussing Canadian defence requirements and fears with the Hon. J.L. Ralston and Hon.

* Instead, merely a Canadian Consulate was established in Greenland during June 1940 (Preliminary Canadian Narrative, Chapter XI). The United States had despatched a Consul to Greenland in May.

C.G. Power.¹ Both Ministers stressed the importance of Newfoundland in any scheme of defence. According to Mr. Moffat's Diary:

With regard to the island of St. Pierre-Miquelon Mr. Power said that if he had his way Canadian troops would occupy it.

Obviously, however, this raises so many political questions that there would be no move without the approval of the Department of External Affairs. If worse should come to worst the Canadians hope to find out what we have in mind with regard to preventing various places such as Iceland, Greenland, the West Indies, etc., from being used as German bases(19).

This last was the line adopted by the Cabinet War Committee two days earlier (27 Jun), when Mr Power had been directed to obtain a report on St. Pierre and Miquelon, and when it had been agreed that any action contemplated for the defence of these Islands, as well as Canadian coastal areas, should be the object of prior consultation with the United States.

17. On 30 Jun Commander F.L. Houghton, Director of Plans Division, submitted to the Chief of the Naval Staff an appreciation on St. Pierre and Miquelon. The gist of this three page memorandum was that these Islands would be of little use to Canada or the enemy: better submarine or surface craft bases existed on the south coast of Newfoundland and could easily be occupied by the enemy. In Commander Houghton's opinion:

¹ From 11 Jun to 4 Jul 40 Mr Power was Acting Minister of National Defence as well as being Minister of National

9. The principal danger at present appears to be the possibility of their use by submarines waiting to attack shipping. It is therefore recommended that air patrols should visit the islands regularly for reconnaissance purposes (20).

In a covering letter forwarding this memorandum to Mr Power on 1 Jul, Rear-Admiral Percy W. Nelles added his own personal opinion that “the Government of Canada (possibly in conjunction with the Government of Newfoundland) might consider setting up a system of administration for the duration of the war, such administration being backed up by the R.C.M.P., as originally proposed for the occupation of Greenland’’. The object of such an administration, he added, “would be merely to deny the islands and fish products to the Germans or the United States”(21).

18. The subject of St. Pierre and Miquelon became more urgent, however, upon receipt of the following telegram despatched by the Governor of Newfoundland, Sir Humphrey Walwyn, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs on 4 Jul:

In view of latest information received this morning we feel increased apprehension as the position of St. Pierre and would like to suggest for consideration that in certain eventualities which

Defence for Air. On that last date Mr. Ralston vacated the appointment of Minister of Finance to become Minister

at present seem not unlikely suitable military and naval action should be taken to prevent the island or French vessels there from hostile action against us or British shipping. We would co-operate in every possible way and would be glad to be kept in touch with any action you may have in mind. French sloop “Ville d’Ys”^{*} is now at St.Pierre and we have accordingly instructed S.S. “Belle Isle”,Canada Steamship Line, not to call there. Presence of this sloop is, however,anxious from our point of view and renders early action all the more necessary. Further, as you are aware, a number of French trawlers are at present operating off St. Pierre and we feel that unless they are brought under control they would also present a potential danger (22).

Later that day the matter was discussed by the Cabinet War Committee. Mr Ralston expressed the opinion that the Islands were of “no great military importance”. It was decided, however, to recommend the institution of a periodic air patrol.

19. Dr O.D. Skelton, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, and Admiral Nelles got together and soon agreed that there were two alternatives: either a show of force sufficient to prevent any possibility of failure, or peaceful and friendly discussion between representatives of

of National Defence.

^{*}Ville d’Ys (ex-Andromide) was laid down in 1916 for the Royal Navy but was turned over to the French Navy and employed latterly on fisheries service. This coal burning sloop had a displacement of 1121 tons, complement of 103, and a radius of 2400 miles at 10 knots. Its armament consisted of three 3.9-in. guns, two 3-in. guns and two 47-mm guns.

the interested parties. There was a 6-in. gun cruiser, H.M.S. Caradoc, in the vicinity and Commodore G.C. Jones, Commanding Halifax Force, could be despatched in her to enforce any action determined by the Canadian Government. According to a memorandum prepared later by Admiral Nelles:

I...strongly advised against any policy which would involve such a showing of force but leave the hands of the Senior Officer tied to such an extent that he would not be empowered to use the force in case it became necessary as proved to be the case at Oran. It was pointed out that the R.C.N. flies the same White Ensign as the British ships at Oran and that it would be unfair to the officers undertaking the mission if they were not, in the last resort, entitled to take similar action. In fact, it would result in a weakening of our position rather than the strengthening which the show of force would be designed to convey (23).

Admiral Nelles favoured the second alternative and offered to place the services of Commander J.W.R. Roy, Director of Operations, at the disposal of the Department of External Affairs to assist any delegation proceeding to St. Pierre. As well as being bilingual, Commander Roy was known personally to both Dr Skelton and R. H.L. Keenleyside (also of the Department of External Affairs).

20. At a somewhat lower level, the Joint Planning Committee, of which Commander Houghton was a member, prepared an Appreciation amplifying his memorandum of 30 Jun:

2. If it is the intention of the Canadian Government to take over the administration of these islands, the Committee are of the opinion that the following action will be necessary: -

(a) Take over the French sloop by the use of a superior Naval force, order her into Halifax or other British port in order to prevent her carrying out any hostile action against us or from falling into the hands of the enemy. The Committee further recommends that this operation should be assisted by a flight of bomber reconnaissance aircraft.

3. The Committee feels that more harm than good may be done by the landing of armed forces prior to gaining definite information regarding the attitude of the population towards the Bordeaux Government, and the probable reaction to the taking over of these islands by the Canadian Government with or without the use of force. To this end they recommend that the Senior Officer of the Naval force should interview the British Consul at St. Pierre with a view to ascertaining whether the presence of troops on the island would be necessary, or alternatively, whether a small police force to back up the Canadian Administrator would be sufficient.

4. If it is found that it will be necessary to station troops in the islands from the point of view of internal security the Committee considers that the maximum number of troops which might be employed would not exceed one company of infantry.
5. The Committee considers that any measure regarding internal security need not necessarily be taken until after the removal of the French sloop and the acquisition of definite information as to the attitude of the local population.
6. With regard to the possibility of the use of these islands as a base for enemy submarines, the Committee concurs in the recommendation contained in paragraph (9) of appreciation...*
7. Owing to the low power of the wireless station at Galantry Head, it is doubtful if this could be used for communication with either Botwood or Sydney but the Committee recommend that this should be investigated by the Senior Officer of the Naval Force.
8. Finally, the Committee is of the opinion that if the population of the island proves to be entirely amenable to Canadian acquisition

* Quoted in paragraph 18 above.

of these islands, a small force of police would be sufficient under an Administrator appointed by the Canadian Government (24).

21. During the course of his conversation with Prime Minister King on 5 July, recounting the results of his trip to Washington, Mr Moffat expressed the hope that Canada would undertake no unilateral occupation of St. Pierre and Miquelon, in view of a proposal to be put before the American Republics (soon to meet at Habana) that a temporary trusteeship might be established over such islands in the Western Hemisphere (see para 16). Mr King admitted that the Governor of Newfoundland had been pressing him to do so:

...but was categoric in his statement that he would not send any troops. He was planning to send a Canadian official, together with a Newfoundland official, to the island to talk over the disposition of a French armored sloop which was either at or near St. Pierre but he would be careful to avoid any untoward precedent. He might also have to send in a ship with relief supplies as the island which depended entirely for its subsistence on ships from France, and its ability to sell fish for these exports, would soon be in a desperate condition...(25).

On the following day, 6 Jul, Mr. King told the members of the Cabinet War Committee that Newfoundland's Commissioner of Defence, Hon. L.E. Emerson, who had come to Ottawa to discuss a number of matters of common interest, had requested that no action should be taken until the Commission Government had had an opportunity to give further study to the problem.

22. It should be emphasized at this point that the French Administrator of St. Pierre and Miquelon was without news from France and had wired the British Consul General in New York and the French Commercial Attaché in Washing and Ottawa seeking relief from the economic crisis which might soon develop as a result of trade restrictions and lack of dollar credits (26).

23. Only on 15 Jul was agreement reached that Commander Roy (in civilian clothes) and Hon. J.H. Penson, Newfoundland's Commissioner for Finance, should proceed to St. Pierre. This intelligence was imparted through official channels to the U.S. State Department (27). Commander Roy and Mr Penson reached St. Pierre by steamship on 17 Jul and later that day had a three-hour interview with the Administrator; also present were the President of the Chamber of Commerce, the senior member of the Administrative Council and the British Consul. At a further and private meeting of 18 Jul, the Administrator spoke much frankly. Commander Roy and Mr Penson remained at St. Pierre until 20 Jul and subsequently submitted a joint report to their respective governments. They felt that, while the Administration was not particularly pro-British, it was definitely anti-Axis. No instructions had been received from France, however, so the Administrator did not know where he stood. De Bournat provided a written guarantee that the Islands would not be used for any purpose by the enemy, but would give only verbal assurance that any enemy activity in the area would be reported without delay. Commander Roy and Mr Penson felt, however, that St. Pierre could offer few facilities to the enemy as a base because:

- (a) There is only one harbour and that small, which can be used; and it is easily reconnoitred by air from Canada
 - (b) There is a shortage of food and fuel supplies in the Islands.
 - (c) These Islands are not suitable for the establishment of air bases
- (28).

The presence of the Ville d'Ys presented a problem, since she came under the jurisdiction of Admiral Robert at Martinique. Another problem was the presence of 12 French trawlers, loaded with fish for which there seemed no longer to be a market. Commander Roy was able to obtain the Canadian Government's agreement (by wireless) for the voyage of one trawler loaded with cod to Martinique. The Administrator insisted that he could carry on the economy for some time, but that something would have to be done about "dollar credits".

24. De Bournat also took passage for Canada on the S.S. Belle Isle, which called at St. Pierre on 20 Jul. Two days later he had an interview with Dr Skelton in Ottawa: the Deputy Minister of Fisheries, First Secretary of the French Legation and Dr Keenleyside were among those present. After the French representatives had guaranteed that the Ville d'Ys would not be employed in any manner hostile to British and Canadian interests, it was agreed that the preferable course would be for it to proceed to Martinique. Matters of finance and the disposal of the present catch of fish were then discussed at some length (29).

25. Back in Ottawa on 31 Jul after a trip to Washington, the Administrator had a further interview with Dr. Skelton and Dr Keenleyside, conversing for an hour through an interpreter.

De Bournat opened the discussion by stating that, as a result of his visit to the United States, complete agreement had been reached between himself, the French legation in Ottawa and the French Embassy in Washington, with regard to the necessity of maintaining cordial relations between St. Pierre and Miquelon and Canada. Everything possible was being done to facilitate the establishment and maintenance of such relations. In view of an order issued by the Vichy Government on 12 Jul that French naval units were not to attack or interfere with British ships, the Administrator felt that there would be no possibility of Ville d'Ys interfering with any British or Canadian ships which might call at St. Pierre. The French Embassy in Washington had suggested to Vichy that Ville d'Ys should either be disarmed or sent to Martinique. Dr. Skelton indicated that either course would be acceptable to the Canadian Government, and expressed the hope that an early decision might be reached. The Administrator replied, however, that the French Government might consider that no further orders were necessary "in the case of so small and obsolete a vessel"(30).

26. The discussion then turned to the question of finance. The Administrator had managed to obtain enough funds to continue for the time being, but he requested assistance in freeing blocked accounts in Canada and dealing with its Foreign Exchange Control Board. It was agreed that the Canadian Government would inquire whether the United Kingdom would be prepared to let the French trawlers sell their existing catch of fish in Spain and Portugal, or agree to them clearing for Martinique should it be found possible to dispose of their fish in the French West Indies. At this point, Dr. Skelton emphasized that there was no longer any difficulty about the issuance of ship clearances from Canadian and Newfoundland ports for St.

Pierre; the number of ships subsequently calling at the Islands would depend purely on the traffic.

27. On 1 Aug the Canadian Minister in Washington, Mr Loring C. Christie,, told Under-Secretary of State Summer Welles that the Canadian Government had no intention of interfering with either the administration or status of St. Pierre and Miquelon. (By an Order in Council of 31 Jul the British Government had extended its “navicert” system of blockade to all Europe; henceforth Metropolitan France and French North Africa were to be treated as enemy-controlled territory.) Mr Christie went on to say that the Canadian Government had read with interest and satisfaction the proposals advanced at Habana for the defence of European colonial possessions in this hemisphere; should any danger arise as regards these Islands, the Canadian Government assumed that this would be a matter of immediate interest to the United States and would be glad to consider any means by which Canada could co-operate in any necessary defensive provision. Mr Welles said that in such an event the United States Government would at once get in touch with the Canadian Government(31).

28. Late in August General de Gaulle and Admiral Muselier began pressing the British Government to permit them to “rally” St. Pierre and Miquelon (32). But political considerations forced the British Government to refuse and to limit its operations to the existing naval blockade against the territories adhering to Vichy. (see para 8).

29. According to a report rendered by the British Consul at St. Pierre on 27 Sep some 85 percent were supporters of General de Gaulle and eagerly awaiting word from him. The

15 percent Vichy and anti-British element was to found among the business and official class. It was his firm opinion that “the policy of the Administrator of Saint Pierre Miquelon [sic] and of several of his Members of Council of Administration, is to maintain the ‘status quo’ at all costs, and endeavour to secure indirect economic advantages from adjoining British Countries without departing from his allegiance to Vichy, this in opposition with the above-mentioned majority of the inhabitants of the islands’’(33).

30. On 31 Oct the Cabinet War Committee in Ottawa discussed the possible implications arising from Marshal Petain’s radio broadcast publicising his recent meeting with Hitler and acceptance of the principle of sincere collaboration with the so-called New Order in Europe. The Committee agreed, however, that any action against St. Pierre and Miquelon – in the event of overt French hostility – should be undertaken with the United States. On the following day (1 Nov) Mr Christie had an exploratory discussion with Mr Welles of this hypothetical question. Mr Welles’ comments on the several points raised were reported as follows:

In principle, he recognized Canada’s special concern regarding these islands and also that it would be desirable to arrive at a joint policy between Canada and the United States. He also thought that the suggestion as to utilizing the Joint Defence Board at some state in the proceedings might turn out to be an excellent one. As regards the question of associating Newfoundland directly or formally with any action that might be taken, Mr. Welles felt that this would be undesirable in view of Newfoundland’s virtual status as a Crown Colony. As regards

the economic position in St. Pierre and Miquelon, Mr. Welles recognized there would have to be discussions in certain contingencies and saw no difficulties. He seemed disinclined to make any comment upon the question of the present Administrator of the islands or of the Chief Justice as a possible alternative, nor upon the question of possible relations with the Gaulle movement, and I did not think it well to press him at this stage.

Mr Welles suggested only one consideration from the point of view of the United States Government. He said that he ought to point out that the other American countries would have some concern about what might be done regarding St. Pierre and Miquelon and that the United States Government would accordingly have to inform them of whatever action the United States and Canada might contemplate.

In conclusion, Mr. Welles indicated that he did not expect any developments to arise immediately, but that he would be glad to keep in touch with me as regards developments that might affect the position of these islands(34).

It might conveniently be noted here that the U.S. Consulate at St. Pierre had recently been re-opened, with Mr Maurice Pasquet as incumbent.

31. Although the Canadian Government had been advised early in September that Ville d'Ys would be ordered to Martinique "as a matter of courtesy", its departure from St. Pierre was long delayed, to the annoyance of the de Gaulle supporters there. Only on 11 Nov did it actually reach Martinique. The last four French trawlers (except for one that had run aground) left St. Pierre on 15 and 15 Dec, laden with fish for a reported destination of Casablanca, and all fishermen from France were subsequently reported to have been repatriated before the end of the year (35).

32. On 14 Jan 41 the Air Officer Commanding, Eastern Air Command signalled Air Force Headquarters at Ottawa to ascertain whether the harbour of St. Pierre "could be used as an emergency anchorage for RCAF rescue vessels in the event of vessel becoming iced up during winter gales when on patrol in that area" (36). Dr Skelton assumed that the "ordinary rules of International Law would and should apply" but wrote to advise the Administrator of St. Pierre and Miquelon that such an emergency might occur (37). On 19 Feb the Administrator replied* that this already had happened:

...on January 24th, 1941 the motorboat "O.K. Service V" of the Royal Canadian Air Force commanded by Captain John Howell took shelter in Saint Pierre's harbour as a result of bad weather conditions.

I am pleased to inform you that a warm reception and all the necessary facilities have been extended to the crew and that the usual navigation

* Translation which appears on file.

duties plus similar charges that are ordinarily levied on foreign vessels entering the harbour at St. Pierre have been omitted.

Prior to his departure on the 25th, I met Captain Howell. I can assure you that, should the occasion arise, this treatment would be given to all vessels referred to in your... letter(38).

33. When a new Canadian Minister to the United States, Hon. Leighton McCarthy, presented his credentials on 12 Mar 41, President Roosevelt asked whether the Canadian Government had given any thought to the future of St. Pierre and Miquelon after the war. He said that the United States had no desire to take over the islands and wondered whether the United Kingdom or Canada had considered the possibility of their acquisition. Mr McCarthy reported that the President's remarks seemed to be based on the assumption that the colony would not remain under French sovereignty(39).

(iv) (A More Positive Approach

34. Although the problem posed by St. Pierre and Miquelon had been kept hidden from the Canadian public during 1940, such a situation was too good to last. Hon. R.B. Hanson, Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons, had written to the Prime Minister on 5 Dec 40 to obtain assurance that measures would be taken to prevent a French fishing fleet returning to the Grand Banks in 1941 and obtaining a valuable catch which might find its way to Germany (40). Mr King assured him, in his reply of 13 Dec, that the Canadian Government had been "keeping

in very close touch with the situation'' on St. Pierre and Miquelon and had discussed various phases of the problem with the governments of Newfoundland, the United Kingdom and the United States (41). Even the publication by Maclean's Magazine, in its issue of 1 Jan 41, of an article entitled "Dilemma on St. Pierre" seems to have aroused little interest. On 1 May 41 Mr Hanson again wrote the Prime Minister, but seems to have been reassured that the Royal Navy was fully alive to the necessity of preventing food from reaching Germany (42).

35. During question time in the House of Commons on 16 May, however, the Leader of the C.C.F. Party, Mr. M.J. Coldwell, expressed the hope that the Prime Minister would inform the House about the position of St. Pierre and Miquelon during the course of his forthcoming statement on the war situation. Such action seemed desirable in view of Marshal Pétain broadcast of the day before, agreeing to Franco-German collaboration in Africa and President Roosevelt's consequent warning to the French people to do no such thing. There was also the point that unfavourable comments on the pro-Vichy Administration of St. Pierre and Miquelon were now beginning to appear in the press (43). After dealing with a question concerning Canada's relationship to Vichy and the Free French Movement, during the afternoon session of Monday, 19 May, Mr King did make a statement about St. Pierre and Miquelon:

...all islands in the northern half of the western hemisphere have been the subject of careful consideration by the permanent joint board of defence, in relation to both military and naval security; and the government of Canada has been watching the situation closely with respect to such islands as are off our coasts. I can assure the house that we have every reason to feel that there is no occasion for concern on the part of the people of Canada in reference to either St. Pierre and Miquelon. I would add that the government is being kept informed of conditions in these islands, also that the government of the United Kingdom in respect to the larger question of the relations between the Vichy government and Germany (44).

36. Newspaper reports of Mr King's statement did, however, upset the Governor of Newfoundland, who already was perturbed by rapidly deteriorating Anglo-French relations over Syria, and cause him to wire Ottawa as follows:

We recognize that the military situation is of immediate and overriding importance, but we hope that we shall in accordance with undertaking of Permanent Joint Defence Board be consulted before decisions are taken.

In the meantime, the question of control of the islands (apart from matter of defence) is one in which Canada and Newfoundland have a common interest, which is of the gravest importance to both, and of vital importance to Newfoundland. It would, we suggest, be unwise to overlook the possibility of control of United States over the islands becoming permanent if they assume it now for the duration of the war.

We assume that the Canadian Government would view such an eventuality with the greatest concern. So far as Newfoundland is concerned, such a result far would be truly disastrous. In the past, French control of the islands within 10 miles of our coasts has necessitated heavy expenditure in customs protective service and substantial loss of revenue in spite of all our efforts. The competition in salt cod fish industry, which has been heavily subsidized for many years, has caused us uncalculable loss.

The establishment of the United States in Saint Pierre and Miquelon would make it possible for them to dominate Newfoundland politically, and if they so decided, to threaten the independence of our fisheries e.g. by establishing a fresh cod industry at St. Pierre. The assumption of civil control by the United States would raise a storm of protest of the strongest kind from our people. In view of relations between Canada and the United States there would arise in their minds a sense of betrayal by Canada of a British interest which at this particular time might have serious repercussions.

If control of the islands is to pass out of Vichy's hands we presume that we have a common desire that they become British, that is, either Newfoundland or Canada. Geographically they are as much a part this country as any other islands that surround our coast, and in their respect bear the same relation to Newfoundland as Magdalen Islands and Anticosti do to Canada. There is easy and frequent intercourse between the two peoples. They can be administered most easily by our Government. In fact there is so little to justify control passing from Vichy to any Government but that of Newfoundland that feeling our people would be almost as great (although for different reasons) to our losing control to Canada as it would be if we lost it to the United States.

Under these circumstance we urge:-

- (1) That before matter of defence of St. Pierre and Miquelon are settled, this Government be consulted;
- (2) That the Canadian Government use its best endeavours to ensure that if civil control of the islands is to pass from Vichy hands, that it be entrusted to the Newfoundland Government (45).

37. The answer despatched by the Canadian Prime Minister on 25 May assured the Governor that no recommendation would be made by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and no decision would be taken by the Canadian Government without prior reference to Newfoundland. Furthermore:

We are keeping closely informed with regard to conditions in the Islands and our present policy, with which you are acquainted, had been discussed with the United States Government who have been most cooperative. In our opinion there is not the least likelihood of the United States taking control of the Islands and while rapidly changing conditions abroad may necessitate a modification in our policy we do not believe that any such change is necessary at present.

While we hope that it may not be necessary to interfere with the political status of the Islands we recognize that some action of this kind may,

under certain circumstances, become inevitable. In such circumstances the whole position will have to be reviewed and consideration given to all pertinent factors including, of course, the views and desires of the residents of the Islands.

If and when political, economic, defence or other requirements make intervention necessary we shall discuss the situation with you and with Washington. In the meantime we are confident that your apprehension that the United States may seize control is groundless (46).

38. Prime Minister King had been as good as his protestations. On the same day (16 May) that Mr Coldwell had asked his question in the House of Commons, Mr King had requested the French Minister in Ottawa to arrange that Inspector Oscar LaRivière, R.C.M.P. might visit St. Pierre and Miquelon to observe conditions at first hand, ostensibly those relating to the Canadian Customs and Preventive Service (47). Permission having been granted by the Administrator, Inspector LaRivière left Montreal on 21 May and reached St. Pierre, via Halifax, on 26 May. The American Minister in Ottawa was advised of what had transpired and was assured that no thought was being given to positive action without prior consultation with the United States (48).

39. Meanwhile the Joint Planning Committee in Ottawa had been instructed to study the possibility of a Canadian occupation of St. Pierre and Miquelon. Its memorandum, dated 22 May, seems to have been based on rather sketchy information, however, the members hoping

that Inspector LaRivière would be able to fill in the details on his return. Even the professed object of the occupation sounds rather vague: “to prevent the use of these islands by the enemy as a refuelling base for submarines, as a refuelling base for aircraft, or as a centre for the collection and transmission of enemy intelligence”(49). It was recommended that the available information should be turned over to the Joint Service Committee of Atlantic Command, which should be ordered to prepare “definite and detailed operational orders” for the occupation of St. Pierre and Miquelon, “for execution if and when the Canadian Government decides such action is necessary”.

40. By coincidence, a letter from the President of the Free French Movement in Manitoba, suggesting that a small party of Free French residents of Canada might be landed, “by parachute or any other suitable means” to take over St. Pierre and Miquelon, had been minuted to the Chief of the General Staff on 23 May (50). General Crerar considered it advisable to ask the Minister of National Defence whether he would like to take up the matter at the next meeting of the Cabinet War Committee (51). Mr Ralston replied in the affirmative and requested him to set forth his views on the subject (52). These were submitted in a memorandum dated 24 May and read as follows:

- (a) The imminence of a move to take over the French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon depends entirely upon the development of the situation as between London and Vichy. This is not promising and in view of the seizure of a French tanker in the Atlantic a day or two ago and with

the situation as it is in Syria, a complete break between the two countries may not be far away. In such circumstances it would appear expedient for us temporarily to take over these islands so as to ensure that they could not be used in any way inimical to the defence of Canada. While this would be carried out by military forces, it should not be looked at as a capture of these islands but rather their temporary occupation for the duration of the war.

- (b) So far as I can judge, the U.S. reaction would be favourable to our doing so, and, so far as I can judge, they would not be desirous of participating. They would probably want to take similar action in respect of French colonial possessions in the Carribean. One point, however, is, I think, clear: that if we do not act, they will, and I am sure it would be preferable for us to do so.

- (c) As the operation contemplated is not a capture or annexation, at least I presume it is not, the utilization of Free French would seem to have a good deal to commend it. It would be an outlet for the enthusiasm of such Free Frenchmen as we have in Canada. It would contribute in a measure to Free French cause throughout the world. It

would save save “Free Canadians” for theatres where their services are more urgently needed (53).

A copy of General Crerar’s memorandum was enclosed with the letter which Mr Ralston sent to the Prime Minister on 26 May. “You will see,” Mr Ralston wrote, “that the Chief of the General Staff says he thinks that if we do not act, the United States will and that it will be, in his opinion, practicable for us to do so. He thinks the utilization of Free French might have a good deal to commend it” (54).

41. After the above proposal had been rejected as impracticable by the Cabinet War Committee, meeting on 27 May, discussion turned to the true functions of the Government’s service advisers and Mr King stressed the importance of ensuring that the Committee’s decisions were strictly carried out. The recent appearance of the German battleship Bismarck in North American waters bore out his consistent contention that hemispheric defence was a primary responsibility, despite the continued efforts of the Chiefs of Staff to concentrate attention on the overseas war effort. Shortly thereafter, and in consequence of an Admiralty decision that there must be “end to end” escort of convoys throughout the North Atlantic, since the U-boats were moving their activities ever westward to avoid British anti-submarine operations, the Royal Canadian Navy agreed to base its available destroyers and corvettes at St. John’s. Commodore L.W. Murray, R.C.N. was placed in command of this Anglo-Canadian Newfoundland Force, which came to handle all convoy work in the area off Newfoundland (55).

42. On 28 May the Chiefs of Staff Committee approved the Report by the Joint Planning Committee and instructed its Secretary to have the Joint Service Committee in Halifax act upon the following suggestions:

- (a) The Force to be transported in two corvettes from Sydney (or if desired, in one destroyer).
- (b) The Force to consist of one company of infantry. (This Company to be furnished by the Sherbrooke Fusiliers.)
- (c) The desirability of air reconnaissance before and, if necessary, during the landing be emphasized.
- (d) The desirability of including the area of the Islands in naval and air reconnaissance plans in the event of occupation (56).

43. No one, however, could be expected to be familiar with all the ramifications inherent in the Act and Convention of Habana. Indeed, the Department of External Affairs was not certain how the United States would regard, and whether it would support, any positive action by Canada which was an “American Nation”. Although the United States claimed that its recent agreement to assist Greenland in its own defence was “consistent with the obligations of the United States under the Act of Habana”, Mr Hull’s Note of 7 Apr 41 had neither “set up a regime of provisional administration” nor, in the words of that Act, placed the matter before the “emergency committee” composed of one representative of each of the American republics (57). Moreover, Mr Hull had not yet answered a letter written by Senator James Mead of New York on 21 May, suggesting that the United States Government should negotiate with Vichy for

the establishment of defence bases in the French islands of the Antilles, St. Pierre and Miquelon and on the territory of French Guiana (58). Mr Hull was not interested in General de Gaulle's message of 26 May offering to collaborate with the American Republics in establishing over French colonial possessions in the Western Hemisphere a "provisional regime which, while preserving French sovereignty over them, would protect them from German aggression" (59), but he took some pains with the reply finally despatched to Senator Mead on 2 Jun; a reply that his member of the Isolationist Bloc in Congress then made public. After assuring Senator Mead that the State Department was watching the situation closely, and outlining the background of existing American policy, Mr. Hull's letter concluded:

Should evidence develop so that further action by this government in the interests of national defense be required, you may be assured that any action contemplated will accord with the agreement reached with the other American republics at the Havana conference (60).

44. As soon as this information reached Ottawa a study was undertaken by the Department of External Affairs and Mr. Norman A. Robertson, its acting Under Secretary of State, requested comments from the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services (61). On 28 Jun the Hon. Angus L. Macdonald replied that the three Armed Services were working out detailed operational plans for a possible occupation of St. Pierre and Miquelon (see paras 54-56):

The principal dangers that can be foreseen, and which the object of our occupation would be to prevent, are the use of these Islands by the enemy

as a refuelling, victualling and rest base for submarines or aircraft, and as a centre for the collection and transmission of enemy intelligence.....

Recent reports of enemy submarines in the Atlantic clearly indicate a steady extension of this type of warfare to the westward. The possibility of German ocean-going submarines using these Islands, not necessarily for refuelling, but merely for the opportunity of rest, recreation and carrying out running repairs, cannot be eliminated. The Islands flank very closely the vitally important routes into and out of the Gulf and River St. Lawrence, and are distant from Halifax 360'; from St. John's, 240': from Sydney, 180'; and from the U.S. Base at Argentia only 115'.

I consider that in the event of open hostilities between the British Government and the Vichy Government, immediate and determined action by Canada will be of vital importance. There are two principal reasons underlying this statement; the actual threat of enemy use of the Islands; and the clear indication that if the Canadian Government fails to act quickly and vigorously, the United States Government is almost certain to do so. Any such action on the part of the United States would inevitably prove most embarrassing, and the situation would be further complicated by the position in regard to St. Pierre and Miquelon taken up by the Newfoundland Government [see para 37]... (62).

45. Although Inspector LaRivière had arrived back at Halifax on 13 Jun and made a lengthy report to Commissioner S.T. Wood of the R.C.M.P., its contents had not yet been communicated to all the interested parties. Inspector LaRivière considered that there had been little change in the situation on the Islands since the summer of 1940. The Administrator and the small pro-Vichy element had done their best to discourage the Free French Movement: reprisals had been threatened against its supporters and, since most of the population were either on relief or dependent on the Administration for their normal means of livelihood, this had had a sobering effect on the hotheads; furthermore, the belief had been encouraged that by joining de Gaulle the colony would lose its monthly subsidy from Vichy (actually obtained through the Canadian and American Governments from frozen French funds). Contrary to earlier reports, the clergy were pro-Vichy. All mail, telegrams and radiograms were strictly censored. This had applied even to the correspondence of the former British Consul, Mr Archibald Bartlett, who had resigned his post early in 1941 and not been replaced. The American Consul, Mr Maurice Pasquet, was now the only representative of a foreign government. Mr. Bartlett had continued as superintendent of the Anglo-American Telegraph Company office (i.e. Western Union), however, and had told inspector LaRivière that he would get out a message to the Canadian and Newfoundland authorities should the enemy appear – by fishing vessel should the cable be cut. With respect to the government controlled wireless station at St. Pierre (with a sub-station on Miquelon), however, Inspector LaRivière 's information differed greatly from the earlier appreciations:

The main station is capable of and is keeping constantly in touch with Bordeaux, France. It is also in communication with Fort de France on the Island of Martinique for

Governmental communications, and insofar as the public is concerned, they may send radiograms through this station to Canada and the United States (63).

46. In conversation with Inspector LaRivière, the Administrator had done his best to minimize the existence of discontent among the population. According to the former's Report:

...he [de Bournat] said the majority of the population was satisfied with the present condition, adding that he would not permit the occupation of the Islands; that they would be defended to the limit, and that the authorities concerned (apparently meaning the Vichy Government) would be advised immediately. However, he said that if the Canadian Government desired to keep posted as to the existing conditions at St. Pierre, he would welcome the appointment of a Canadian Consul. (The impression I gained from his remarks was that he would prefer a Canadian Consul at St. Pierre to Canadian or other allied Military forces; and that he was definitely opposed to the occupation of the Islands by the Axis Powers.) He also informed me that a number of Italian fishermen endeavoured to come to St. Pierre last year, but he emphatically refused to allow them entry and would not, under any consideration, allow any German or Italian to enter the Island for any purpose whatever, of that we might rest assured.

Inspector LaRivière believed that the vast majority of the inhabitants would welcome the arrival of Free French forces; they would have no objection to Canada or the United States taking over the islands for the duration of the war, "preferably the latter, for financial reasons". He had

gained the impression, however, that “occupation by Newfoundland troops would not be so favorably received”.

47. Shortly thereafter, the British Government entered the picture more directly. In consequence of a decision that Free French Naval sloops would shortly be detailed for convoy duty in the Western Atlantic and based on Newfoundland, Admiral Muselier suggested that one of them should put into St. Pierre and rally the islands. Before giving him an answer the British Government sought the views of the Canadian and United States Governments. The letter despatched to Mr Norman Robertson on 9 Jul 41 noted:

...that one objection to the proposed operation is that any attack on Vichy territory exposed the Vichy Government to fresh demands by the Germans, through which our interests might suffer, and that we might lose heavily on the deal if the Germans were able to use a successful Free French operation in St. Pierre as a lever for obtaining further concessions in North Africa (64).

48. The Cabinet War Committee subsequently directed that Canada’s in relation to St. Pierre and Miquelon should be studied and reported upon by the Defence Departments and the Department of External Affairs. On 21 Jul representatives of the three Services met with Mr Robertson but, in view of the complexities of the matter, no decision seems to have been reached (65).

49. On 31 Jul the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Ottawa again wrote Mr Robertson, hoping to be advised as to the Canadian Government's policy, since his Government was becoming more perturbed by the possibilities inherent in St. Pierre and Miquelon on being adjacent to convoy routes. Having ascertained that the U.S. State Department was adopting the attitude that St. Pierre and Miquelon were primarily the concern of the Canadian Government and that its policy was likely to be influenced by the views of the Canadian Government, the British Ambassador in Washington had postponed making any approach until such time as the Canadian view could be ascertained (66).

50. Mr. Robertson's own opinion seems to have been that a suitable naval officer might be retired temporarily and appointed to a civilian post at St. Pierre; unfortunately, however, the Navy considered that there was no suitable officer available (67). On the other hand, when asked to comment on Mr. Macdonald's letter of 28 Jun (see para 45), Commissioner Wood was emphatic that there should be no delay "until something disastrous happens" before taking over the Islands (68). Although his suspicions of the good faith of the ruling element of St. Pierre undoubtedly were based on his experience with the pre-war smuggling of liquor, it was his considered opinion that such action would be welcomed by the majority of the inhabitants. The Chiefs of Staff Committee agreed with this view and, in a submission of 21 Aug, recommended to their Ministers that such action be taken. It was pointed out that a plan for the occupation of St. Pierre and Miquelon had been drawn up and could be initiated on six hours' notice (69).

51. However, on 18 Aug the Prime Minister had decided to establish a Canadian Consular Office at St. Pierre and had designated Mr C.C. Eberts, a third secretary in the Department of

External Affairs, as Acting Consul (70). On 1 Sep Mr. Eberts arrived at St. Pierre and was given provisional recognition by its Administrator, pending the granting of an exequatur (71). Shortly thereafter he began reporting regularly to Ottawa. Despatch No. 10 of 19 Sep was an interim report on political conditions on the Islands and included a short biographical note on each of the principal officials. Regarding the operations of the radio-telegraph station, and its sub-stations on other islands, Mr Eberts wrote:

It is impossible to ascertain what information the main station is sending out to France, Martinique and New York, as all confidential messages are, of course, given to it in cypher, and only the Administrator and his Secretary, Mr. Charles Cormier, handle cypher messages. It is not believed here that the Administration would report convoy movements even if it should receive work of them, and I do not think that any St. Pierre vessels go south into the shipping lanes, I feel, however, that this question can only be settled satisfactorily if an experienced telegraphist is employed to take down every message leaving the station over a period of a month or two, so that these messages can be sent to Ottawa to be broken down (72).

52. In a lengthy despatch of 25 Sep, explaining a public statement by de Bournat that neither he nor his Alsatian wife were “violently anti-British and unpatriotic French citizens”, the Canadian Consul expressed doubts whether the Administrator would carry his co-operation with the Vichy Government far enough to necessitate a Canadian occupation of the Islands, but

suggested that further measures were likely to be taken against de Gaullist sympathisers among the population (73). Other despatches dealt with the movements of the Islands' fishing vessels and the attitude of the population to the Canadian Government's decision to requisition the fishing schooner Cap Bleu, which was being built in a Nova Scotia shipyard for the Administration. During the same weeks the R.C.M.P appear to have devoted a good deal of attention to the activities of a pro-Vichy shipowner, M. Auguste Moufroy, who was having his tug Bearn repaired at Pictou, Nova Scotia (74).

(v) The Organization of "Q" Force

53. On 6 Jun 41 the war diarist at Headquarters, Atlantic Command recorded that the Joint Service Committee had held a special meeting under the chairmanship of Major-General W.H.P. Elkins:* no details were given, however, since the discussion was "most secret" (75). On 11 Jun an Appreciation and detailed Plan were forwarded to the Chiefs of Staff Committee in Ottawa (See Appendix A). The former stressed that "little guidance" had been given on the "purely political aspect of the proposed Operation": furthermore, it was considered that "in any occupation made by a military force detailed guidance as to the Commanders authority in civil administration should be furnished, and steps should be taken to have a civil mission accompany the force" (76). Since it would be a combined operation against an unorganized defensive area, there would be no need for naval landing craft and fire support, or for aerial bombardment and low flying attack. Thus a dual or unified command was not justified:

* General Officer Commanding-in-Chief.

- (a) the responsibility of the voyage and method of landing will rest with the Naval Commander acting in co-operation with the Military Commander and
- (b) as far as Air is concerned the use of aircraft will be the responsibility of the Naval Commander up to the time the first troops disembark and from then on, the Military Commander.

No organized resistance was expected. The troops merely would have to occupy the vulnerable points listed and prevent any subsequent attempts at hostility or sabotage by pro-Vichy sympathisers (armed possibly with rifles). In view of scanty intelligence, the Plan for Operation “Q” was somewhat vague and phrased in generalities. Force “Q” was to be an infantry rifle company, augmented by a detachment from headquarters company of the same unit and attached Engineer, Signals, Medical and Army Service Corps personnel (See Appendix “A”). Command was vested in the lieutenant-colonel of the regiment from which the rifle company was selected. The Naval requirement was envisaged as two corvettes and one destroyer, while an R.C.A.F. bomber reconnaissance squadron would be needed to maintain a flight of five aircraft continuously over the Islands until the landing had been consolidated (77).

54. On 28 Jun the Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee replied that the use of a destroyer could not be justified; two corvettes should provide the necessary “show of force” and a small merchant vessel might be engaged as a transport if necessary. Since it was beyond the capabilities of one bomber reconnaissance squadron to maintain five aircraft continuously in the air from dawn to dusk, particularly should the Operation last more than a single day, it was

suggested that the Plan call for only three aircraft being in the air continuously. It was further suggested that a detachment of R.C.M.P. might accompany the Force to aid in civil administration and control. Finally, it was emphasized that it might be “necessary to put this plan into operation at short notice at any time” (78).

55. In the reply despatched to Ottawa from Halifax on 3 Jul stating that the proposed alterations had been made, additional information was requested regarding the suggested employment of an R.C.M.P. detachment (79). Commissioner Wood’s help was then sought. On 10 Jul he wrote the Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee that the senior R.C.M.P. officer at Halifax would be instructed to get in touch with General Elkins (80).

56. Reference to “Q” Force in the war diary of The Lake Superior Regiment* which moved from Saint John to Camp Debert on 12 Aug and was selected to provide for this operation, are terse and not very informative, creating the impression that very few individuals had any idea of the proposed role. The following are the first references given by the diarist:

- 14 Aug- “C” Coy. Ordered to stand by for a scheme but no details given.
- 15 Aug- The “Q” Force a self contained unit has been formed under the Command of Lieut.-Col. H. Cook. The unit consists of one complete Rifle Company, “C” Company

* The Sherbrooke Fusiliers Regiment did not move into Atlantic Command as had been contemplated earlier.

with attached personnel. The unit is standing to waiting orders to proceed on a Special Test Exercise.

16 Aug- “Q” Force still awaiting further orders concerning their impending move. This “Q” Force is strictly made up of volunteers for this particular piece of work. They are to be issued with canned beans and Hardtack as rations for two meals and sandwiches for one meal.

18 Aug- “Q” Force still standing by for orders. They are carrying out their own training syllabus.

19 Aug- “Q” Force had an inspection by Major D.M. Marshall M.C. [company commander], both morning and afternoon. Still awaiting further orders.

21 Aug- “Q” Force still standing by and their Operations Orders received from Lieut.-Col. H. Cook [see Appendix “B”].

22 Aug- “Q” Force still carrying on their own training.... “Q” Force received passes for 36 hours, this being their first break from C.B. since the “Q” Force was organized. All returned on time (81).

In view of the action taken by Prime Minister King on 18 Aug to appoint a Canadian Consul to St. Pierre and Miquelon (see para 52), the unit operation order, putting “Q” Force on four hours’ notice to “move to Sydney to attack and destroy and invading enemy” already was obsolescent when issued. But, although the Cabinet War Committee agreed on 30 Aug that no action need

be taken at present, only on 17 Sep was a letter despatched to the G.O.C.-in-C., Atlantic Command, advising him that the Operation would not take place on less than 72 hours' notice (82).

(vi) The Plot Thickens

57. Although the Canadian authorities became more concerned about the existence of an uncontrolled radio-telegraph station on St. Pierre, as the autumn weeks went by and the number of ship sinkings in the Western Atlantic increased, finding a satisfactory solution presented quite a problem (83). In a letter of 21 Oct the United Kingdom High Commissioner repeated an earlier suggestion that the Free French naval forces based on Newfoundland should be permitted to rally the islands. On 29 Oct the Cabinet War Committee rejected this request, but agreed that the Canadian Consul at St. Pierre should approach the Administrator with a proposal that Canadian personnel be positioned in the wireless station to control all outgoing messages and prevent the use of cypher or any code which they were not able to read. Such monitors might also be charged with the inspection of radio equipment in fishing boats and other vessels (to make certain that their equipment was not capable of long range transmission). On 3 Nov the Canadian Legation in Washington informally approached the State Department with this proposal. Although it was assumed that the Permanent Joint Board on Defence "would undoubtedly approve this step", the Canadian Government did not consider that action should be delayed for a month until the Board held its next meeting (84). Mr. John D. Hickerson *later

* In addition to being a member of the Division of European Affairs within the State Department, Mr Hickerson was serving as secretary of the American section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

wrote that the Canadians were informed verbally, on 8 Nov, that this memorandum “had been noted and we had no comments to make”. He added: “This was intended and so understood by the Canadians as constituting a green light for them to go ahead”(85). In actual fact the Permanent Joint Board on Defence held its next meetings at Montreal on 10-11 Nov, when it was ‘unanimously agreed that the existence on the Islands of an uncontrolled and high-powered wireless transmitting station constitutes a potential danger to the interests of Canada and the United States’(86).

58. It was not until 3 Dec, however, that Prime Minister King elaborated on the earlier proposal in a telegram addressed to Prime Minister Churchill:

We have felt that the matter might be best approached by having a senior officer of the Department of External Affairs** visit St. Pierre and inform the administrator that the Canadian Government, in the interests of Canadian security and, in fact, North American security generally, considers this supervision essential and to express the hope that the administrator will see his way to co-operate.

Should the administrator object to this supervision, such rejection would appear to be prima facie evidence that suspicions with respect to the use

*On 26 Nov the Cabinet War Committee had agreed that Brigadier G.P. Vanier, D.S.O., M.C. should so represent the Department of External Affairs. In addition to still holding the appointment of Minister to France (absent on leave), Brigadier Vanier was District Officer Commanding, Military District No. 5 (Quebec). He also had been added to the Canadian section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence as a French-speaking member.

to which the transmitting stations on the islands may be put are well founded.

The question would then immediately arise as to the course to be taken as a consequence.

In that connection we are considering the advisability of sending to the islands, either with the senior official or subsequently upon receipt of word from him, four technical radio inspectors. These latter would be under charge of a member of the Royal Canadian Navy, probably of petty officer rank, who would himself be responsible to our acting Consul in St. Pierre. The technical radio inspectors would be directed to pre-censor all incoming and outgoing wireless and cable messages and to supervise all radio transmitting stations on the islands. It is proposed that they should be taken to St. Pierre in a corvette or minesweeper. The administrator would then be informed that the Canadian Government attaches such importance to this matter that in the circumstances the commander of the corvette had been instructed to leave a detachment of ratings in the islands in charge of the petty officer, to protect the technicians and to see that there is no interference with the supervisors in the performance of their duties.*

* * When the draft of this telegram was submitted for approval to the Cabinet War Committee on 1 Dec, Prime Minister King had questioned the wisdom of a "show of force".

I recognize that with the relations between Vichy and Berlin what they are just at this time, and the situation in the Orient what it is, action of the kind might be interpreted by Vichy as an effort by Canada to take control, if not possession of the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon – a French colonial possession; and that Vichy might seek to find in the incident, particularly at a moment when Darlan is collaborating so closely with Hitler, an excuse to turn over the French Fleet to Germany as a means of protecting French Colonial possessions.

The situation has its bearing, of course, on what is taking place in North Africa, and also upon the attitude which the United States has taken towards the French Colonial possessions in the Western Hemisphere and particularly in the Caribbean.

In the circumstances, I have felt that any action on Canada's part in the matter should be delayed until after we had ascertained the views of the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the United States in reference thereto. I shall be grateful to receive at the earliest convenience an expression of your own views in the matter. Meanwhile I am making a similar request of the Government of the United States (87).

On 5 Dec Mr Hume Wrong of the Canadian Legation in Washington handed a copy of the above telegram to Under Secretary of State Summer Welles, who promised to reply as soon as possible (88).

59. Mr Churchill has an alternative suggestion, however: he requested the Canadian Government to ascertain the American attitude towards General de Gaulle's reiterated proposal that the islands should be occupied by Free French forces. Personally, Prime Minister Churchill could see no objection to such a course and considered it preferable to the Canadian Government taking action in what 'might create an embarrassing political situation' (89). His telegram emphasized, however, that no action would be taken unless the consent of the American and Canadian Governments was obtained. According to The Memoirs of Cordell Hull:

This suggestion did not appeal either to the Canadians or to ourselves. For my part, I looked with something like horror on any action that would bring conflict between the Vichy French and the Free French or the British. Though our advice had not been asked, I had been strongly opposed to the British attack on the French fleet at Oran in 1940, and I had worked hard to bring Britain and Vichy France back into some degree of friendship (90).

60. Here the situation rested when Admiral Muselier arrived by train in Ottawa from Halifax on 15 Dec – a bare eight days after the United States had finally become a belligerent. It appears

that when Admiral Muselier had left England during November to inspect Free French naval units serving on convoy duty with Royal Canadian Naval vessels, General de Gaulle had given him carte blanche to act. But, following his arrival at St. John's, and discussion with members of the Newfoundland Government, Admiral Muselier came to the conclusion that it would not be desirable to take any action without first reaching an understanding with the Canadian and American Governments. General de Gaulle was informed to this effect, and that Muselier was proceeding to Ottawa to attempt to secure such concurrence (91).

61. Following lunch and a lengthy discussion with the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services and Admiral Nelles, Admiral Muselier had an interview with the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, * who stated his preference for the Canadian proposal which had been advanced to London and Washington. Admiral Muselier was then advised that, since Canadian policy was linked (étant liée) to that of the United States, it would be “indispensable” to have a talk with the American Minister in Ottawa (92). Such an interview was quickly arranged. Muselier told Mr Moffat that the population of St. Pierre and Miquelon was entirely favourable to the Free French Movement and that occupation could be achieved without bloodshed. Such action would remove the threat of a wireless station on the flank of the convoy routes. He further suggested that his forces might then attempt to take over Martinique – an action which ultimately would be necessary but which would create less unpleasantness for the United States with the Vichy régime were it handled by the Free French (93).

* Although Muselier uses the terms “secrétaire d’Etat aux Affaires étrangères” and “ministre des Affaires extérieures”, it seems more likely that his interviews were with Mr Robertson. Had he seen Mr King it is suggested that he would have referred to him in his text, either by name or as the Prime Minister.

62. After reading Mr Moffat's telegram of this interview, President Roosevelt indicated that he did not favour any Free French action at St. Pierre and Miquelon. This information was telephoned to Mr Moffat on 16 Dec (94). During that same day the Canadian Cabinet War Committee came to the conclusion that "any action taken should be by Canada".

63. On the following morning (17 Dec), Mr Moffat called on Admiral Muselier and explained that President Roosevelt considered that it would be a mistake for the Free French to occupy the Islands. The "President felt that there would be fewer adverse repercussions if the Canadians took control of the communications from the island, by suasion, if possible, but otherwise by stronger means and assured themselves, the United States and the Allied Powers that no communications of a deleterious nature left the islands" (95). Thereupon Admiral Muselier indicated that he would not proceed with the planned occupation. Being also discouraged from his vague proposal to occupy Martinique, and his desire to visit Free French representatives in New York and officials of the State Department in Washington, the Admiral seemed in a quandry. According to Mr Moffat's Diary:

The Admiral then asked what he should do. Here he was with his three corvettes in Halifax and in an embarrassing position. I suggested that he work out this problem with the Canadians. His idea at the moment is to remain in Canada more or less indefinitely, confident that the Canadian control of St. Pierre will not work and that he, or he and the British in

conjunction, can persuade Washington to change its official mind (96).

64. But a telegram of 18 Dec from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs advised the Canadian Government as follows:

The President's view has been represented to General de Gaulle who agrees that proposed action should not, repeat not, now be taken.

We have again carefully considered your suggestion that steps should be taken to supervise wireless station at St. Pierre by Canadian personnel.

We fully appreciate the reasons in favour of this proposal. There is, however, always danger that it might arouse hostility among Islanders.

Moreover, our military advisers feel nothing short of occupation of Island by British or Allied forces would really meet the case from military point of view. This course, however, now seems ruled out by United States attitude as disclosed in your telegram.

In the circumstances it seems wiser not to take any action for the time being (97).

On the following day Prime Minister King told the members of the Cabinet War Committee that no action would be taken until agreement had been reached between the British and American Governments. On 22 Dec Mr Hume Wrong of the Canadian Legation in Washington advised

the State Department that, in view of the British attitude, the Canadian Government would not go ahead with its proposed action. Mr Wrong added that the Free French Forces had cancelled any action (98). This, it might be added, was the day on which Mr Churchill and his entourage arrived in Washington for the so-called “ARCADIA” Conference.

(vii) Occupation of the Islands

65. General de Gaulle had not, however, given up the idea of rallying St. Pierre and Miquelon. On 17 Dec he telegraphed Muselier as follows:

Nos négociations nous ont montré que nous ne pourrions rien entreprendre à Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon si nous attendons la permission de ceux qui se disent intéressés. C’était à prévoir. Solution est une action à notre propre initiative. Je vous répète que je vous couvre entièrement à ce sujet (99).

On the following day Admiral Muselier received a further telegram from de Gaulle, this a direct order to act:

Nous avons, comme vous le demandiez, consulté les gouvernements britannique et américain. Nous savons de...certaine que les Canadiens ont l’intention de faire eux-mêmes destruction du poste de T.S.F. de Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon. Dans ces conditions, je vous prescris de procéder au ralliement de Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon par vos propres moyens et sans rien dire aux étrangers. Je prends l’entière responsabilité

de cette opération devenue indispensable pour conserver à la France ses possessions (100).

General de Gaulle has since written in his Memoirs that, as soon as the Foreign Office confidentially advised him of the Canadian proposal to take over the radio station at St. Pierre, hesitation was no longer possible. He could not accept foreign intervention on French territory (101). Admiral Muselier's first thought was to offer his resignation. Only a sense of duty and belief that the Free French Movement would suffer a serious loss of unity and prestige, were a rift to develop between the General and himself, convinced him of the necessity of carrying out the order (102). Thereupon Admiral Muselier proceeded to Halifax by train and put to sea with three corvettes* and the giant submarine Surcouf on 23 Dec, ostensibly to return to St. John's. But, around three a.m. on 24 Dec they took peaceful possession of St. Pierre. That afternoon a force was landed on Miquelon from the corvette Alysse (103). The wireless station in Newfoundland then received its first signal of the day from St. Pierre, when a request was made to transmit three telegrams from Admiral Muselier (104). The one addressed to the British Government, read as follows:

I have the honour to inform you that in compliance with order quite recently received from General de Gaulle and request of inhabitants I have proceeded this morning to island Saint Pierre and rallied people to Free France and Allied cause with enthusiastic reception (105).

* Mimosa, Alysse and Aconit.

The others were addressed to General de Gaulle and to the Canadian Government. Interviews were given to the Canadian and American Consuls, to whom Admiral Muselier explained his intentions. The following proclamation was issued to the inhabitants:

Conformément aux ordres du général de Gaulle, je suis venu pour vous permettre de participer librement et dans l'ordre au plebiscite que vous réclamez depuis si longtemps. Vous aurez à choisir entre la cause de la France Libre et la collaboration avec les puissances qui affament, humilient et martyrisent notre patrie. Je ne doute pas que le plus ancien de nos territoires d'outre-mer, se rangeant aux côtés de la Grande-Bretagne, des Etats-Unis, du Canada et des autres alliés, ne manifeste en masse sa fidélité aux traditions d'honneur et de liberté qui ont toujours été l'orgueil de la France (106).

Despite the fact that the bishop, Monsignor Poisson, had issued a statement that he could not “en conscience” recognize the occupying force as the legitimate government (107), the plebiscite held on Christmas Day showed that 98 percent of the voters were in favour of the Free French Movement. Criticism was later directed at the wording of the two choices:

- (1) Ralliement à la France Libre,
- (2) Cooperation avec les puissances de l'Axe (108).

But, fortunately, an American newspaperman, Ira Wolfert of the New York Times, acting on a “hunch”, had managed to accompany the expedition and his despatches convinced the American public that the plebiscite had been conducted in a fair and democratic manner (109).

66. The immediate result of this fait accompli was to create a diplomatic furore on Christmas Day. The Canadian Government was embarrassed and the United States State Department frantic. Only the evening before Mr. Norman Robertson had assured the Vichy Minister in Ottawa that neither the Canadians nor Free French would occupy the islands. But when Mr Robertson hastened around to explain, the French Minister did not give the impression that “the occupation would be straw that broke the camel’s back in Franco-Canadian Relations (110). Mr. Robertson later told the American Minister that Prime Minister King was “particularly upset, that the episode would prove an embarrassment to him in Washington tomorrow, but that he planned to talk it over with the President and Mr. Churchill shortly after his arrival” (111). Mr Moffat next had a few words with the United Kingdom High Commissioner. Mr Hull phoned Mr Moffat to demand that Canada take steps, that afternoon, to restore the status quo. The fact that the Canadian Government might be reluctant to do so, particularly in the event that the plebiscite then being taken in the Islands proved favourable to the Free French Movement, was completely lost upon Mr. Hull. The long distance telephone between Washington and Ottawa continued to buzz and several Christmas dinners were delayed. Mr Moffat vainly endeavoured to convince members of the staff of the Department of External Affairs that the action demanded by an irate State Department should be taken (112). Prime Minister King’s reaction, as reported to Mr Moffat was as follows:

If the British and the United States jointly asked Canada to take action, Canada will of course do so. Thus far, however, Britain had not expressed herself at all, and the American request is certainly far from concrete. He was leaving in less than two hours and would feel much happier deferring action until he could talk it over at greater length with the President and Mr. Churchill. Meanwhile, he wanted Robertson to come to Washington with him, even though he would not take him to the White House talks. Mr Robertson should continue searching for a possible formula or recommendation of action. As soon as something concrete were put before him he would study it. Until then he hoped there would be no publicity (113).

67. Unfortunately, however, Mr Hull had already authorized the State Department to release a very controversial statement:

Our preliminary reports show that the action taken by the so-called Free French ships at St. Pierre-Miquelon was an arbitrary action contrary to the agreement of all parties concerned and certainly without the prior knowledge or consent in any sense of the United States Government.

This Government has inquired of the Canadian Government as to the steps that Government is prepared to take to restore the status quo of these islands (114).

68. The press immediately began badgering Mr King for a statement and Mr Moffat records in his diary that the official Canadian attitude now changed from one of “helpful cooperation” to one of “most reluctant cooperation” (115) Canadian officials failed to be impressed by (what they must have considered a remote possibility) that Vichy would retaliate by allowing Germany to seize the French fleet and occupy North Africa. They also resented the American attempt to discredit de Gaulle and other “Free Movements”. Moreover, they saw no reason why Canadian servicemen should risk coming to blows with the Free French, should Admiral Muselier forcibly resist eviction from the Islands (116). Late in the evening Mr Moffat received over the telephone, for transmission to Washington, a message which Mr King and his Defence Ministers had drafted on the train to Montreal:

Canada is in no way responsible for the Free French occupation of St. Pierre. We have kept in close touch with both the United Kingdom and the United States of this question and have always been ready to cooperate in carrying out an agreed policy. We decline to commit ourselves to any action or to take any action pending such agreement. In the circumstances and until he have had an opportunity of considering action with the President and Mr. Churchill, the Canadian Government cannot take the steps requested to expel the Free French and restore the status quo in the islands (117).

69. In the United States the reference to the “so-called Free French” touched off a violent explosion of American public opinion. Professor William L. Langer has concluded that the excitement was created more by hatred of Vichy and its policy of collaboration with Germany than by devotion to de Gaulle and his Free French Movement, about which the great majority of Americans know next to nothing. In a volume entitled Our Vichy Gamble, historian has written:

Rarely had the Department been exposed to more abusive criticism. The Union for Democratic Action demanded reconsideration of the American condemnation and declared, in a protest sent to Secretary Hull: “Surely appeasement of Vichy need not go so far as to guarantee Vichy’s rule in parts of the Western Hemisphere like the island of St. Pierre.” Groups of prominent citizens, probably more well intentioned than well informed, adopted the same argumentation and demanded that the President reorganize the Department’s personnel so as to bring it “into line with the anti-Axis war effort to which the rest of the Government and the country itself are dedicated” (118).

70. But Mr Cordell Hull refused to abandon his stand and became more incensed as the days went by, especially against Mr Churchill who refused to condemn or even censure the Free French action. Alone among the Roosevelt Cabinet, Mr Hull had managed to escape public criticism during the Administration’s nine years of office and now he found it an unpleasant experience. Moreover, as Mr Sumner Welles had since written: “As long as he [Hull] was Secretary of State he regarded any public criticism of his department or of a policy for which he

assumed responsibility as a personal affront, and an affront that he would not forgive” (119). At first the President refused to take the matter seriously. He could not be deeply disturbed by an incident which seemed trivial to the point of ridiculousness in comparison with all his other problems. At a time when Mr Churchill and he were engaged in the planning of global war and the formation of the greatest coalition in history, he could hardly consider entering into an open dispute with the United Kingdom over such a question (120). Elsewhere Mr Welles has written:

The most damaging feature of the St. Pierre-Miquelon incident was that it greatly hampered the American government in continuing its relations with Vichy and in carrying out its policies in North Africa. But neither course could be abandoned if the American and British plans for the invasion of North Africa were to be carried out successfully (121).

71. Mr Hull did manage to work out a compromise, which he thought would be agreeable to Vichy, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States, and make perfectly logical the withdrawal of the Free French forces. This provided that the three Governments should exercise joint supervision over the Islands, which would be neutralized and demilitarized. Canada and the United States would provide personnel to control the wireless station. The Administrator would be withdrawn for the duration of the war, to be succeeded by a consultative council. All armed forces would be recalled and the United States and Canada would provide economic assistance (122). There were, however, practical considerations that made acceptance impossible for all the interested parties. Naturally enough the armed forces of Canada and the United Kingdom had welcomed the removal of the potential menace to shipping. On 28 Dec 41

the United States Army's Newfoundland Base Commander recommended to Washington that St. Pierre and Miquelon should be left in Free French control (123). The question was discussed during Mr Churchill's visit to Ottawa: with the Cabinet War Committee on 29 Dec, when it was agreed that the maintenance of relations between Canada and Vichy might continue to be useful, and in Mr Churchill's speech to Parliament on the following day, when he poured scorn on the Vichy leaders and paid glowing tribute to the French French (124). Although Mr Churchill did agree to take a strong line with General de Gaulle, the latter realized that the attempts at intimidation were being made in an effort to humour Mr Hull. According to General de Gaulle's Memoirs:

Mr Eden saw me twice on January 14th and put up a show of insisting that we should agree to the islands being neutralised, to the administration being independent of the National Committee and to a control by allied officials being established on the spot. As I refused such a solution, Mr Eden announced to me that the United States was thinking of sending a cruiser and two destroyers to Saint Pierre. "What will you do then?" he asked me. "The allied ships," I answered, "will stop at the limit of territorial waters, and the American admiral will come to have lunch with Muselier, who will be delighted." But if the cruiser crosses the limit?" "Our people will summon her to stop in the usual way." "If she holds on her course?" "That would be most unfortunate, for then our people would have to open fire." Mr Eden threw up his arms. "I can understand your alarm," I concluded with a smile, "but I have confidence in the democracies"

(125).

That same day the Cabinet War Committee meeting in Ottawa, agreed that Canada should not participate in any coercive measures attempted against the Free French. Protests were made, but Vichy accepted the fait accompli and there was no severance of Franco-American or Franco-Canadian relations - a policy that was in line with the attitude displayed by the French Minister in Ottawa to Mr Moffat on Christmas Day (see para 67).

72. But only on 2 Feb did Mr Hull reluctantly admit to President Roosevelt that it would be best to let the matter rest until the end of the war (126). Then at a press conference of 13 Feb, while Mr Hull was on a much needed holiday in Florida. Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles stated that, in his judgement, the Act of Habana did not apply to St. Pierre and Miquelon (127). But, although the appointment of an American Consulate General at Brazzaville in French Equatorial Africa during April indicated de facto recognition of the Free French Movement in certain African and Pacific areas, none of the State Department's releases made any reference to St. Pierre and Miquelon (128).

(viii) Demise of "Q" Force

73. During the autumn of 1941 there had been occasional entries in the war diary of the Lake Superior Regiment indicating that "Q" Force was still carrying on extra training of a "hardening" nature. The entry for 15 Dec mentioned that "Q" Force was being reorganized: personnel desiring to spend their Christmas Leave at more distant centres than Saint John were being replaced by men who would be staying in camp. It was emphasized that the Force was still standing by and was on 56 hours' notice to move (129). On the following day the Secretary

of the Joint Service Committee at Halifax wrote N.D.H.Q. to discover whether the above degree of preparedness was still required, or could those concerned be notified that the need for the plan as an “active measure” was past (130). Admiral Nelles agreed with the Chief of the General Staff that there no longer was any need to keep “Q” Force on 72 hours’ notice, but suggested that the degree of readiness might be made one week (131). Due to the diplomatic crisis occasioned by Admiral Muselier’s occupation of St. Pierre and Miquelon, however, this information was not sent to Atlantic Command. Instead a letter despatched to the G.O.C.- in-C. on 17 Jan 42 merely pointed out that the subject was still under consideration (132).

74. On 23 Jan 42 the Director of Staff Duties at N.D.H.Q. advised the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence that, during a recent visit to Camp Debert, the future of “Q” Force had been one of the questions raised by Headquarters, 4th Canadian Division: would its continued existence interfere with the conversion of this division into an armoured formation (133)? Minuting this memorandum to the Chief of the General Staff on 27 Jan, the Vice Chief of the General Staff suggested that, while the Plan could not be put completely in abeyance, it might now be placed on a seven days’ basis of readiness. This would enable the conversion of infantry battalions to armoured regiments to proceed, and permit General Elkins to earmark “any available unit” for this role (134). The Chief of the General Staff concurred and the G.O.C.-in-C., Atlantic Command was advised accordingly in a letter dated 29 Jan 42 (135). Two days later the Lake Superior Regiment left Debert Camp and moved back to Saint John, New Brunswick (136).

(ix) Subsequent Events

75. Mr Eberts' despatch of 26 Dec 41 to the Secretary of State for External Affairs reported on the coup d'état in the light of his interview with Admiral Muselier. After defending his recent action (see para 66), Admiral Muselier had discussed the knotty problem of local defence as follows:

The Admiral has stated to me with complete cordiality, but nevertheless with every indication of determination, that he feels that, in view of the results of the plebiscite, he must defend the Islands against all possible attacks and that he would be unwilling to abandon them since a very large percentage of the population have now openly committed themselves to the Free French Movement and might be expected to suffer reprisals.

While he would name only the French forces as "possible attackers", the Admiral made it quite clear that he also had in mind at least those of Canada and the United States, and that he felt that I should inform you of his attitude. It may be added that he has spoken in identical terms to the United States Consul with a similar end in view.

You will, of course, appreciate that the majority of the population in these Islands are too overjoyed with present events here to be able to understand the difficulties which they may entail for the Allies in the wider sphere of policy and that, particularly with the leadership of occupation forces, they might well put up a stubborn resistance to any attempt to reverse the results of the occupation and

plebiscite, even if they knew from the outset that it was doomed to failure. It should perhaps be added that the Admiral's fear of reprisals against the de Gaullists in the event of his forces being withdrawn or overcome has already been substantiated to some extent. Yesterday evening, when Dr. Gau, the Chief of the Health Service was listening to the news of Mr. Cordell Hull's statement on the occupation of these Islands, at the United States Consul's house, he said with obvious relish that there would certainly be reprisals if there was a further change here. Again, today, a thoroughly reliable informant who has on various occasions furnished useful information to the United States Consul and myself, tells me that he has had an identical reaction from Mr Georges Landry, a local merchant. The attitude of these men would probably be typical of the pro-Vichy and rather anti-British elements here (137).

Subsequent despatches reported that Admiral Muselier continued in command of the defences and responsible for all matters which were not purely administrative. Five changes had been made in the membership of the Council but the new Administration Lieutenant (i.e. Capitaine de Corvette) Alain Savary, was carrying on local affairs with a mixed group of officials, which included those who had not been vehemently pro-Vichy. The Free French continued tolerant, open opposition on the part of the pro-Vichy minority soon became rare, and there was a steadily decreasing number of accounts of hostile remarks made in private conversations. Some 400 men, women and boys had offered their services to a Home Guard, the Women's Auxiliary Corps, the Free French Navy and its naval cadet school in the United Kingdom. Although the Clergy had officially withdrawn its opposition to the new régime on 20 Jan 42, only two priests

were actually co-operating fully. As long as there seemed hope that the United States might take some action to force the Free French to vacate the Islands, Monsignor Poisson endeavoured to follow a policy of “wait and see”, whilst those pro-Vichy members of the mercantile class who were not undergoing the mild form of detention establishment of Ile aux Marins in the harbour mouth of St Pierre (along with the former Administrator and his wife) continued to live in hope (138).

76. Two of the Free French corvettes had left for St. John’s on 26 and 27 Dec 41, while the submarine Surcouf sailed for Halifax on 12 Jan 42 (under orders to proceed to the Far East) (139). In accordance with arrangements completed with Commodore Murray, the Mimosa and certain Canadian corvettes were earmarked to provide a convoy service between St. John’s and St. Pierre and between St. Pierre and North Sydney. (140) (During February these last were embodied as the Western Local Escort Force.) On 23 Jan the Norwegian freighter Havorn sought shelter in the harbour when her convoy was attacked by U-boats only six to eight miles off St. Pierre (141).

During the afternoon of 26 Jan, H.M.C.S. Louisburg put into St. Pierre to pick up two freighter and a Canadian icebreaker which has been convoyed from North Sydney by Mimosa. Five members of this corvette’s crew were taken into custody after creating a disturbance while intoxicated, and doing about \$10.00 worth of damage to private property. Admiral Muselier treated this incident in a light-hearted manner, however, assuring an apologetic Canadian Consul that it was an incident which might occur in any port during wartime. (142).

77. But Admiral Muselier did become incensed because some equipment and stores shipped for England for his garrison were being detained at Saint John, New Brunswick, where they had been unloaded, 'on orders from Ottawa'. This action had been taken at the request of the British Government, which was still worried lest the U.S. State Department should insist on some positive action being taken against the Free French at St. Pierre and Miquelon. Early on the morning of 3 Feb Admiral Muselier lodged a verbal complaint with the Canadian Consul. The items being held consisted merely of "two double machine-guns and ammunition" for use by two high speed runrunner launches being refitted for service as submarine chasers, 200 bags of kit for newly enlisted marines and a variety of propaganda material. By an unfortunate coincidence, the Canadian Naval authorities at Halifax had just requested Commandant Birot of Mimosa to convoy three vessels from Louisbourg to a rendezvous off St. Pierre. The Admiral told Mr Eberts that, although Mimosa would carry out this assignment, the Free French Navy would undertake no further convoy duty until the stores at Saint John had been released, and that the submarine Surcouf would be held in Bermuda and not proceed to the Far East as schedules. The Admiral then read the text of a telegram that he was despatching to General de Gaulle. Mr Eberts reported to the Secretary of State for External Affairs that the feelings of the Admiral had been hurt by the manner in which he and his forces had been treated as a second – rate ally. Mr Ebert's despatch concluded as follows:

My understanding of your attitude towards the Free French Movement is that you are willing to cooperate with it discreetly in every way possible, provided you are not asked to take any action which will embarrass our relations with the Vichy Government. From recent conversations with the

Admiral I feel satisfied that he realizes that Canada has very good reasons for continuing to recognize the Vichy Government, and that he is anxious to see his Movement act with proper discretion in its dealings with the Canadian Government. For these reasons, I feel that it would be mutually advantageous if he were to go to Ottawa; if he could be reassured by you that you the Canadian Authorities respect the Free French war effort; if the limits of Canadian cooperation could be described to him fully; and if he could be assured that steps will be taken to prevent the occurrence of further incidents which could be interpreted as unfriendly (143).

78. British action was now taken to secure American acquiescence in the release of the non-military items of stores being held in Canada. Agreements having been secured from Washington on 10 Feb, Canadian Naval authorities were directed on the following day to arrange for their clearance for St. Pierre. A clearance was not obtained for the military items, however, until early in March (144). Henceforth, naval stores were issued by the Royal Canadian Navy to the Free French at St. Pierre and charged against their "Admiralty account" (A.H.Q. Report No. 76).

79. On 13 Feb Admiral Muselier left St. Pierre to return to the United Kingdom. Free French Headquarters in London had reported that Muselier was a sick man and that his "threat" over the above incident should not be taken "too radically" (145). Actually, as the Admiral had told both the Canadian and American Consuls at St. Pierre as early as 26 Dec 41 (see paras 66

and 76), he was fed up with General de Gaulle's dictatorial régime. On 4 Mar 42 he resigned as National Commissioner for the Navy and Merchant Marine. Although Muselier insisted that he had not resigned as Commander-in-Chief of the Free French Navy, deadlock was only resolved by his finally refraining from taking any further part in Free French affairs until General de Gaulle and General Giraud merged their organizations into a French Committee of National Liberation in June 1943 (146).

80. Before leaving North American waters, however, Admiral Muselier had expressed a desire that the wireless station at St. Pierre should be operated as a Free French Naval wireless station within the Royal Canadian Navy's coast W/T organization (147). This was approved. But the further request by the Flag Officer Newfoundland Force, that an R.C.N.V.R. officer be posted to St. Pierre for liaison duties was vetoed by Mr Norman Robertson. Mr Robertson replied to Admiral Nelles On 19 Feb that "for the time being while the situation in the Islands is straightening itself out, it would be better for Admiral Murray to communicate with St. Pierre through the Free French cypher officer stationed in St. John's than to second a Canadian officer for this purpose to St. Pierre" (148).

81. Only on 19 May 42 was Mr Eberts able to make a detailed report to Ottawa on the defences of the archipelago. As early as 12 Feb he has reported upon the location of a makeshift, zig-zag boom, laid across the northeastern entrance to the St. Pierre roadstead and closed from dusk to dawn, when all communities were blacked out, as well as the coastal lights and lighthouses (149). All members of the local forces were naval and on full time service. They consisted of officers, petty officers and ratings landed from the corvettes, recruits awaiting

transfer to the corvettes or to the United Kingdom for training, a "home guard" of men over 30 years of age (wearing battle dress), boys in training to become ratings and a women's corps for clerical and cypher work. Armament comprised only one 90-mm gun, one 75-mm gun, a few obsolescent machine guns and a variety of rifles. In addition to the guards stationed at a number of vulnerable points, there were three so-called "combat groups" (10 men armed with an automatic rifle and nine rifles, much as an infantry section) capable of being rushed by truck to any danger point. It was considered that, so long as resources were concentrated on St. Pierre, any small landing parties from enemy submarines or surface vessels could be dealt with successfully. Only a few members on the "home guard", armed with rifles, were stationed at Miquelon village. Two of the larger motor launches formerly used as rumrunners (Astrid and Henry Joe) were being fitted as submarine chasers, while other local vessels had been commandeered for general naval purposes. If Asdic equipment could be procured and arrangements made to have the daily submarine reports communicated to St. Pierre, Astrid and Henry Joe would be used on anti-submarine patrol between St. John's and Sydney (150).

82. Under the direction of Capitaine Gaston Lavoisier, formerly of the French Air Force, work has recently commenced as a relief project on the construction of an airfield to the south of the inner harbour. This was being prepared for use by the amphibian plane the Administrator was hoping to obtain, and for possible use by any Free French or other Allied service aircraft which it might be desirable to base there. There was also the expectation that St. Pierre might be a port of call when the trans-Atlantic service of Air France should be resumed after the war. It was hoped that one 1000-metre landing strip of crushed stone and earth could be completed by September 1942; two further 1200-metre runways were planned for construction in 1943. About

60 men with a tractor, a steam-roller and trucks were presently engaged, but there was a shortage of both manpower and equipment and enquiries had been made as to whether the machinery used by the Americans at their Argentinia air base could be made available. As Mr Eberts had reported earlier, both the present and previous Administrators had no doubt but that, despite the prevalence of fog during much of the year, air service was a practical possibility (151).

83. The Department of External Affairs agreed that the Administrator might visit Canada in June for dental treatment, to discuss Church problems with Cardinal Villeneuve and to meet the Free French representative in Ottawa, but it was considered that he should avoid press or radio interviews (152)

Learning of this proposed visit, the Admiralty suggested to Admiral Muselier's successor as National Commissioner for the Free French Navy that Lieutenant Savary should discuss with Naval Service Headquarters in Ottawa the possibility of developing the Islands as auxiliary bases for patrol convoys and sea planes. (153). The Admiralty signal to Naval Service Headquarters presumed that Canada would "wish to make full use of facilities offered by Free French consulting with U.S. as you consider necessary"(154). Admiral Nelles brought this matter to the attention of Dr Keenleyside, his letter of 21 Jun concluding that "the wireless facilities would be of value to the Navy, and the harbour might be used to a limited extent as a Naval base" (155). Although Lieutenant Savary was advised that the Canadian Government was favourably disposed and that naval officers would visit St. Pierre to inspect existing installations and examine possibilities, no official reply seemed desirable until the matter had been cleared in

Washington (156). Only on 27 Jun did Mr. L. B. Pearson (Minister-Counsellor at the Canadian Legation) telegraph Mr Robertson as follows:

Regarding proposed visit of Canadian naval officers to St. Pierre, I have discussed this matter with Hickerson, who said he was glad to get the information in question, but did not think it was necessary to take it upon with anyone else in the State Department, as no misunderstandings were likely to arise. He felt that question need not be brought up at the Joint Defence Board. I emphasized to him that the visit in question was purely technical and operational with character and that we wished the United States authorities to know of it in advance in order to counteract any exaggerated reports based on wrong interpretations which might possibly reach them (157).

The memorandum which Mr Robertson submitted to the Prime Minister that day, elucidating the problem, read in part:

It is proposed to send two officers from Canadian Naval Headquarters in St. John's to St. Pierre to study the best ways of coordinating Canadian wireless services with St. Pierre wireless services, particularly in the fields of communications, meteorological service and radio beacons. They will also look into the possibility of using the harbour at St. Pierre for repairing and servicing small patrol craft to relieve some of the strain

on harbour facilities in Halifax, St. John's and Sydney. They will also examine the possibility of using St. Pierre as a supplementary supply base for servicing the slow convoys between Halifax and St. John's. Some of these convoys are guarded by small patrol craft whose range of action is so limited that they cannot make the whole journey without refuelling. It is thought that it might be possible to use the harbour at St. Pierre as a convenient half-way house where the small boats could take on additional bunkers and ship's stores.

Two motor launches now in St. Pierre would be sent to St. John's to determine whether it was possible to equip them with Asdic (submarine detecting apparatus). If this proves feasible, these boats would be assigned regular patrol duty, operating from St. Pierre, which would be coordinated into the general plans for patrolling the East Coast. Naval Services have inquired whether there would be any political objections to proceeding with these tactical arrangements. I told them that I did not think there would be. The general question of the status of the Islands, which remains in abeyance, would not be affected by these plans for closer defence co-operation with the Free French Naval Services in the Gulf (158).

84. It might be conveniently noted here that, the official Canadian and American attitudes towards the Free French occupation of St. Pierre and Miquelon were undergoing modification,

in consequence of the U-boat campaign being waged against coastal shipping, which hitherto had been moving safely without the need for convoy protection. Although the U-boats were concentrated on such focal areas as Hampton Roads, North Carolina and Cape Hatteras, and had found the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico also were good hunting grounds, there has been sinkings in Canadian coastal waters during the winter (see para 77). During March Canadian ships were withdrawn from the Western Local Escort Force for convoy duty between Boston and Halifax (159). Although the Royal Canadian Navy possessed a "Plan GL 2" for convoying ships using the St. Lawrence River and its Gulf, this was placed in effect only on 12 May after two freighters had been sunk to the north of Cape Magdalen by the submarine U-553 (160). Three days later the matter was raised in the House of Commons and, in view of the undue alarm and excitement created among the civilian population of the lower St. Lawrence, the Armed Forces were forced to adopt more elaborate measures than the situation actually required (A.H.Q. Report No. 30). Yet 19 of the 20 freighters torpedoed in these waters during 1942 actually sank, along with a corvette, a frigate and an armed yacht on escort duty. Although the United States refused to make any further concrete gesture towards the presence of the Free French at St. Pierre and Miquelon, it was now obvious that no action would be taken to upset the status quo. Therefore, on 1 Aug the Administrator removed the restrictions against Allied aircraft flying over the Islands (161).

84. On 9 Aug a party of four – Lieutenant-Commander (E) E.W.T. Surtees, R.C.N.R., Mr C.A. Williams, R.C.N. (Warrant Telegraphist), Captain J.C. Baker, R.C.A. (Headquarters, "W" Force) and the United States Vice Consul in Newfoundland – arrived at St. Pierre. They found that the naval installations had been somewhat strengthened since Mr Eberts' report. Their

mission having been accomplished, and having been well entertained by various officials, the party left on 12 Aug. The gist of the reports rendered individually on their four-day visit appears in the recommendations forwarded on 19 Aug to the Naval Board in Ottawa by the Flag Officer Newfoundland Force:

I consider that St. Pierre should be used as an anchorage for ships rather than as a flying boat base, but, as a hanger is to be created next Spring on the south side, of the harbour, it is possible that this could be made available to R.C.A.F. for emergency use.

It is considered that St. Pierre is a most valuable potential base for light surface ships in pursuance of the "Spare Bedroom" policy, which was the chief reason for the development of Botwood, i.e., to have defended ports strategically placed for Operations in the Atlantic.

The two slipways which are at present in good condition could be made suitable for Fairmiles, and I concur in the recommendation that the two not now in operation be converted to one capable of docking a corvette.

The existing repair facilities could be developed and put to good use.

It will be necessary to provide a Liaison staff...(162).

85. Some time was to elapse, however, before the Naval Board felt justified in deciding these several points. During the course of the weekly Naval Staff meeting on 31 Aug the Chief of the Naval Staff expressed the opinion that a base of this sort would be of use only in an emergency – seeking shelter in stormy weather. Thus a considerable expenditure was not warranted. The Chief of Naval Engineering and Construction added that it was possible to have too many bases for small ship repairs: if not already reached, such a situation soon would be (163).

Not until 8 Sep, however, was it agreed that a bilingual R.C.N.R. officer, suitable for shore appointment only, should be appointed as a liaison officer and directed to investigate the possibilities of further use of the Island (164).

86. On 7 Oct Dr Keenleyside asked Captain E.S. Brand, Director of Trade Division, if the Naval Board were doing anything about a liaison officer for St. Pierre. Dr Keenleyside thought there should be no objection to the proposed action, “under the present political situation, and that it would be all to the good to have one there” (165). Dr Keenleyside added that the Department of External Affairs would be glad to have a naval liaison officer serve as Consul, since this would enable the present incumbent to be employed in some other post. Lieutenant-Commander J.J. Deslauriers, R.C.N.R. was selected and, after a period of briefing, arrived at St. Pierre on 29 Oct.

87. Although Surgeon Lieutenant-Commander A.L. McKay, R.C.N.V.R. had made a very favourable impression during his visit 1-11 Sep to examine the colony’s sanitary

conditions(166), Lieutenant-Commander Deslauriers made a very bad impression from the outset and became the reason for a minor diplomatic crisis. As he was docking, Deslauriers was greeted by a number of merchants (of the discredited pro-Vichy element) and merchant seamen who apparently were old acquaintances of rumrunning days. His first unofficial visit was to the Bishop, still considered to be the leader of the pro-Vichy element. At a luncheon party Lieutenant-Commander Deslauriers was reported to have criticised the United Kingdom and his treatment in the Royal Canadian Navy. His attitude plainly indicated that he was a supporter of the Bloc Populaire partly headed by Mr. Maxime Raymond. In consequence, the Canadian Vice-Consul deemed it unwise to make available his confidential office files and proceeded to report most unfavourably to Ottawa (167). The Administrator complained to the French Committee in London, which has been on the point of agreeing that the function of Canadian Consul might be exercised by the Naval Liaison Officer (168). On 9 Nov it was decided at a meeting in the East Block, presided over by Mr Norman Robertson and attended by the Director of Naval Intelligence, that Lieutenant-Commander Deslauriers should be recalled. (Mr Eberts was present, having returned to Ottawa for duty, leaving in temporary charge Mr A.J. Pick of the High Commission's staff in Newfoundland). The qualifications required in a successor, according to the Department of External Affairs, were as follows:

The Canadian Naval Liaison Officer should be married and should have considerable educational background. Age is of little importance. Ability to speak French is the least important qualification, as the Government and naval authorities, as well as many of the residents, speak English. It was suggested that it would be preferable to have an English speaking

Canadian to a French speaking Canadian, who spoke with a decidedly French Canadian accent. It was pointed out that the Fighting French Government and naval authorities are particularly sensitive to expressions of political opinion and it was recommended that the Canadian Naval Liaison Officer should be thoroughly grounded in the political situation, and should also be capable of being particularly discreet in this connection (169).

88. That same day, and as a consequence of the resistance being offered to the Allied landings in North Africa by the local French forces, Canada and the United States broke off diplomatic relations with Vichy, Prime Minister King issued a statement that “there no longer exists in France a government that has any effective independent existence - in other words...there no longer exists in France a legal or constitutional government in any sense representative of the French people, but only a German puppet government” (170). Although Major-General G.P. Vanier subsequently was accredited as Minister to the Governments-in-Exile located in London, he was directed merely “to act in consultation with the French national committee on matters relating to the conduct of the war” (171).

89. Lieutenant-Commander Deslauriers was removed from St. Pierre as soon as transportation could be arranged and Mr Pick continued to represent Canada at St. Pierre until 11 Dec, when Lieutenant D.E. ffolkes Jemmett, R.C.N.V.R. assumed the dual post of Acting

Consul for Canada and Canadian Naval Liaison Officer.* Lieutenant Jemmett seems to have had a satisfactory tour of duty. However, as he reported to the Secretary of the Naval Board on 1 Feb 43.

Notwithstanding the fact that most of the officials, with whom I am in contact, speak English moderately well, a knowledge of the French language is important. During meals and leisure hours, when valuable knowledge and information are to be gathered, all discussions are in French. As much time as possible is therefore given over to study of the language of which I had a slight knowledge before coming to St. Pierre. All correspondence of the Commandant requiring an English translation is done by me, and at my request; English is spoken only when absolutely necessary (172).

90. The plan to fit the motor launches Astrid and Henry Joe with Asdic equipment for employment as submarine chasers (see para 82) having proved impracticable, the Free French authorities had requested the Admiralty to provide three Canadian-built Fairmiles. Since the United States was considered responsible for supplying requirements within an American controlled theatre of operations, the request had, been passed to the United States Navy, which had refused and referred the matter to the Royal Canadian Navy. Although the Naval Board in Ottawa was favourably disposed, questions of availability and method of transfer delayed action

* Born in Cobalt on 13 Apr 12, Douglas Edward ffolkes Jemmett had been employed by his father's firm, Northern Canada Supply Limited at Kirkland Lake before being commissioned into the R.C.N.V.R. in August 1941. At that time he claimed some ability to converse in French and German. Prior to his posting to St. Pierre he had served on

from 9 Nov 42 until 14 Jan 43, when it was recommended to the Department of External Affairs that the most practicable arrangement would be to loan three Fairmiles “as is” [then at Sydney] for the duration of hostilities: all costs in connection with maintenance, alterations and additions to be charged to “Admiralty account” on behalf of the Free French (173). It had already been agreed (31 Dec 42) that the fuel tanks required by these Fairmiles could be supplied from Canadian sources under similar financial arrangements (174).

91. Meanwhile the Chiefs of Staff Committee had been giving some thought to the airfield under construction at St. Pierre, for which assistance first had been sought by the Administrator during his visit to Ottawa in June 1942 (see para 84). Because of the success achieved in enlisting most of the able-bodied men into the Free French forces, there was a local shortage of labour and the Acting Canadian Consul had reported on 27 Nov 42 that most of the 80 to 100 workers were either quite young or old. Few were skilled in any way, while many were undernourished fishermen unaccustomed to regular hard manual work. Local materials and hand labour had been used to date, but proper construction equipment was being sought under Lend-Lease arrangements from the United States and builder supplies would be required for surfacing the runways and constructing hangars (175). At its meeting of 22 Dec the Chiefs of Staff Committee recommended that the Defence Council point out to the Department of External Affairs that this project should not be carried to completion unless adequate provision was made for defence (176). On 8 Jan 43 the Defence Council approved this recommendation and requested the Department of External Affairs to ascertain whether the defence measures adopted by the Free French at St. Pierre were adequate (177).

the armed yacht H.M.C.S. Reindeer. He was actually at St. Pierre from 5 Dec 42 to 17 Oct 44. Subsequently he

92. The same question was discussed by the Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, meeting in Ottawa on 2 Feb 43, and Rear-Admiral George C. Jones was directed to communicate with the Naval Liaison Officer at St.Pierre (178). Lieutenant Jemmett's report of 10 Feb stated that, owing to unusually severe weather conditions, all work had been virtually at a standstill since the middle of December 1942. The officer in charge of construction had assured him, however, that the single, as yet incomplete, runway could be used for emergency landings should there be time to remove the snow and mark its boundaries. However:

The project as originally planned, is visualized as a base for a French Transatlantic Airline after the war and as such will require French monitoring equipment. As it did not appear that the Canadian Government was interested in using the base during the war, no consideration has so far been given to the possibility of obtaining and installing Canadian or American equipment.

Commandant Dillfroy explained that great loss of time had been experienced in obtaining materials and consequently in work accomplished due to the fact all demands for equipment had been made through Free French Headquarters in London for provision under the lease-lend arrangements from the United States (179).

Then, on 2 Mar 43 the Chief of the Air Staff provided Hon. C.G. Power with an appreciation, which concluded as follows:

In view of the protective screen provided by the Defence Forces already established in Newfoundland and the Maritime Provinces, the probability of the enemy attempting to make use of the landing strip now under construction on the Island of St. Pierre et Miquelon is considered very remote. Therefore, it is considered that no additional defence measures are necessary for St. Pierre et Miquelon (180).

92. Mr Power's further question of the same day as to the R.C.A.F.'s interest in this airfield does not seem to have been answered, despite a hastener from his private secretary on 20 May, until the subject was raised by Dr Keenleyside on 18 Jun 43 (181). Four days earlier Lieutenant Jemmett had written that a new Administrator, M. Garrouste, had decided that further airfield construction work would be carried on slowly, at minimum expense and without costly equipment, should the airfield not be required by Canada for wartime use (182). The fact now came to light that the International Division, Army Service Forces had turned down a request made by the Free French purchasing staff in New York for equipment to complete the airfield (183). The U.S. War Department considered that it was responsible for meeting Free French requirements within an American strategic sphere, but St. Pierre and Miquelon was clearly within Canada's so-called "North American Area" (AHQ Report No. 76). The British members of the London Munitions Assignment Board now argued that St. Pierre and Miquelon was definitely part of the Canadian local defence, pointing out that the United States Navy had

refused earlier to supply the Free French Navy with three Fairmiles and considered that Canada should deal with all its requirements (184). In view of the fact that neither the Royal Canadian Navy nor the Royal Canadian Air Force considered that the airfield at St. Pierre was a necessary requirement, and so advised the Department of External Affairs, however, there was no point or interest in continuing the controversy. (185).

(x) Conclusion

93. Unfortunately it is impossible to carry this story further because of a lack of documentary evidence. The fourth and presumably final volume of the relevant naval file (NSS 1037-5-14) would seem to have become lost or mislaid during the period of reorganization following the conclusion of the Second World War. From other sources it appears that Lieutenant (latterly Acting Lieutenant-Commander) D.E. ffolkes Jemmett continued to perform his duties as Naval Liaison Officer in a manner satisfactory to both the French and Canadian Naval authorities until his departure from St. Pierre on 17 Oct 44. The post of Canadian Consul appears to have been abolished early in 1944, however, in consequence of the posting of Major-General G.P. Vanier to Algiers as Canadian Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation (see para 80). With the Battle of the Atlantic seemingly on the way to being won and the Second World War entering its final stage, the strategical and political importance of St. Pierre and Miquelon rapidly lessened and the archipelago lapsed back into the obscurity from which it had emerged in June 1940. It is of some interest to note, however, that General de Gaulle had retained his popularity there. On 28 Sep 58 an overwhelming majority of the voters

(2325 out of 2395) cast their ballots in favour of the new constitution which he had fathered (186).

94. This report was written by J. Mackay Hitsman.

(C.P. Stacey) Colonel

Director, Historical Section (G.S.)

APPENDIX "A"

APPRECIATION

by the

Joint Service Committee, Atlantic Coast

OBJECT

1. To prepare a plan for the occupation at short notice of St. Pierre and Miquelon.

FACTORS

2. Political

(a) The Committee note that little guidance has been given on the purely political aspect of the operation.

(b) All information obtained indicates that the present ADMINISTRATOR is NOT favourably inclined towards an occupation and has his instructions from Vichy, as per appendix "A" attached.

(c) No information is available as to whether or not activity of the Nazi system has spread to these islands.

(d) It is considered, therefore, that in any occupation made by a military force detailed guidance as to the Commander's authority in civil administration should be furnished, and steps should be taken to have a civil mission accompany the force.

3. Disposition of Forces

Enemy

- (i) From information presently available there are probably no organized or semi-organized military forces in existence.
- (ii) It is, however, reported that there are 14 Police Officers who are armed with revolvers and there are a number of demobilized soldiers in the town. It is further reported that there are a large number of sporting guns in existence.
- (iii) From information gathered from ship's Captains, the following should be noted--
One 4" gun is mounted at CAPE AIGLE.
(This has not been confirmed by any other source).

An armed trawler is based on St. Pierre. Type of armament unknown. Good Gunner in charge.

A 24 hour look-out is stationed at GALANTRY HEAD AND DIAMONT POINT.

- (iv) Therefore, it is considered advisable to look upon the operation as one made in an enemy territory with a possibility of hostile attitude by a proportion of the population.

(b) Own.

- (i) One coy, of infantry has been allotted as the occupying force.
- (ii) This force must be transported by sea.

- (iii) Air coverage is essential.
- (iv) Therefore, the operation falls in the category of a combined operation.

4. Command

- (a) Being a combined operation the question of Command requires to be clearly defined.
- (b) The operation constitutes the occupation of an unorganized defensive area, therefore no planned Naval fire support will be required, no Naval special landing craft will be used and no planned serial bombing or low flying attack is required.
- (c) In view of the above it is not considered that a dual or unified Command would be justified but Command should be vested in a Military Commander. This Command would be operational only and subject to the fact that:
 - (i) the responsibility of the voyage and method of landing will rest with the Naval Commander up to the time the first troops disembark and from then on, the Military Commander.

5. Secrecy

- (a) Too much stress cannot be laid upon the necessity for secrecy
- (b) Therefore the normal procedure in respect to the restriction and listing of those authorized to know about the operation, use of designation letters, issue of orders and deception generally will be followed.

- (c) Cypher personnel will be necessary with the force Commander to handle traffic once the force is established.

6. Topography.

(a) St. Pierre.

- (ii) The coast line is generally rocky. The country itself is open and rocky. Very little vegetation grows. Practically no trees.
- (ii) The North West portion of the island is a rocky plateau rising steeply from the sea to an altitude of from 200 to 600 feet. The South and East portion of the island, which includes the town of St. Pierre, is much flatter with a maximum altitude of 186 feet at Galantry Head.
- (iii) The principle landing places in and around St. Pierre are Coal and Refrigerator Docks, Government Wharf in inner harbour, small beaches at Philibert Bay and Ravenal Bay on the North East side of town.
- (iv) The principle roads are as follows:
 - (a) Road from the Coal and Refrigerator docks to the town of St. Pierre. This road is paved and capable of carrying any type of traffic at high speed. The land rises sharply on the landward side.
 - (b) Town roads. Not paved but hard surfaced and reported in good repair.
 - (c) Road to Savoyard Bay (small fishing village and Summer Resort 3 miles West of St. Pierre.) This road is also paved and can handle any traffic.

(d) Road from St. Pierre to Galantry Head and from St. Pierre to Ravenal Bay (Cable Station). These are second class roads but are reported as hard surfaced and in good repair.

(b) Miquelon

(i) 83 square miles. Practically all the inhabitants live at the town of Miquelon (500), which is situated on Miquelon Bay near the northern extremity of the island. The area in the vicinity of the town is flat.

(ii) The village of Miquelon faces on a long beach and has a small wharf suitable for use under favorable weather conditions.

7. Vulnerable Points

(a) All vulnerable points are situated on St. Pierre as far as is known, therefore, although Miquelon must later be occupied under the terms of reference, it is not proposed to do so until St. Pierre has been made good.

(b) These vulnerable points are:

(i) Wireless Station (reported to be the only transmitting station in St. Pierre.) is in the town situated on the main road near the reservoir.

- (ii) Cable and control station located in the town itself. The Western Union has a business office on the water-front.
- (iii) Customs House and Post Office are on the water-front. The Government Offices, Government House. (painted white and green) and police station are situated behind a garden square facing the Government dock, in the inner harbour.
- (iv) There is a telephone system in the town but the position of the exchange is unknown.
- (v) Coal dock and dock opposite the Refrigerator plant in the outer harbour.
- (vi) The power plant is situated on the highway between the coal pier and the town. This plant is reported to consist of water-power plant with diesel plant standby.

8. Objectives

(a) Military

- (i) Arising from para 6 and para 7 above, the objectives to be seized appear to be:
 - (a) W/T Transmitting station near reservoir.
 - (b) Administrative area bordering on the Government Wharf, inner harbour, containing:

Administrative Offices & Government House

Police Station

Customs House.

Post Office.

(c) Cable Relay Station.

(d) Power Plant.

(e) Telephone Exchange.

(f) Cable Landing (Ravenal Bay)

(ii) These should be occupied with speed and in a definite manner with a view to paralysing any possible resistance

(b) Naval

(i) To effect the rapid occupation of the V.Ps a direct landing should be aimed at.

(ii) Dockage is available and therefore a run-in alongside will be a primary Naval objective.

(iii) Landing to be made at the coal dock.

(iv) On the other hand last minute circumstances may necessitate anchorage and landing by Naval small craft. Loading of ships and Army plans must so conform.

(c) Air

(i) A last and first light reconnaissance should be made prior to the operation and continual sorties during the actual operations.

9. Time and Space

(a) (i) The vital moment of the operation is the moment of landing. The time table for the operation will be based on this.

(ii) Therefore zero day of operation should be the day of landing and zero hour the time at which the landing signal is given.

(iii) Weather (fog) may influence the Naval situation considerably (and also air). At the same time no covering fire schedules, or bombing schedules, are required, therefore delay under cover of fog will not affect the conduct of the scheme.

(iv) As organized opposition is not a likely factor, there appears to be no need to complicate navigation by attempting to land under cover of darkness. The time table should therefore, be such that the last moment approach (length depending on navigational aids required) only will be after first light.

(b) Distances in and around the town of St. Pierre:

(i) Coal docks to centre of town, 1 and 1/8 ml.

(ii) Greatest diameter of town, 1 and 1/8 ml.

(iii) Least diameter of town, 1/2 ml.

(v) Ravenal Bay to centre of town, 1 and 5/8 ml.

(vi) Galantry Head to centre of town, 2 1/2 ml.

10. Tides

In view of the draught of the ships, tides will not influence the situation.

11. Administration.

(a) Although the area of landing and the objectives lie in a centre of population, the maintenance policy should be devised so that until resources can be assessed, the force is self-contained. This, therefore, will require sufficient food and ammunition supplies with the force to cover the interval until a L. of C. can be established. 30 days reserve and 7 day partly fresh are recommended to accompany the force.

(b) Water, however, provided usual precautions are taken, need not be carried. An early report is required on this situation once force has landed.

(c) Medical facilities during landing operations can be handled by the unit (Med. Detail attached) with evacuation to Naval Craft. Early facilities on shore, however, will have to be made.

(d) The time of the year and location is such that special clothing does not appear necessary.

(e) Accommodation cannot be assessed until occupation is secure. At the same time the force is small and will be distributed on operation duty where habitation exists. Therefore, for a short period, at least, tentage or otherwise need not be considered.

COURSES

12. Own

- (a) The operation is not one to force landing nor one which will be exposed to re-enforcing elements of an enemy force.
- (b) The only course appears to be to seize the V.Ps and consolidate our occupation.

13. Enemy

- (a) Without any organized military force enemy activity can only be centred on individual hostility and probably isolated sabotage.
- (b) The possibility of some organizations or individuals using fire arms cannot be overlooked, and/or gun fire from the 4" gun and/or armed trawler reported.

PLAN

1. Command

Operation to be under Military Commander exercising Command
Operationally with the Naval and air provisos as follows:

Naval—Responsible during voyage and for method of landing, acting in co-operation with Military Commander.

Air—Use of aircraft responsibility of Naval Commander up to the time the first troops disembark—thence Military Commander.

2. Secrecy

All precautions to be taken to conceal the operation. In this connection strict adherence to lists of who may be made conversant with the operation is to be followed, prior to the actual issue of detailed orders after the convoy has sailed. Operation to be known as Operation "Q".

3. Forces

Naval:

2 Corvettes.

1 Destroyer.

Military:

Force H.Q.

Lieut.-Colonel

Adjutant

I.O.

Cypher Officer

Clerks (2)

Security Police (3)

R.C.E.

1 Sgt.

2 Sprs.

R.C.C.S.

1 Officer

1 Sgt.
8 Operators signals
2 Operators mobile switchboard
3 Operators (cable and morse)
2 Linesmen signals
(3 Motorcycle combinations)

Infantry

1 Coy. (fully equipped to War Establishment)

plus detail from H.Q. from:

No. 1 Platoon

1 N.C.O.
4 Signallers
2 Orderlies (bicycles)

No. 4 Platoon

1 Officer
1 N.C.O.
8 Other Ranks
(5 M/C combinations)

No. 5 Platoon

1 N.C.O.
2 Pioneers

No. 6 Platoon

4 Cooks (1 to be an N.C.O.)

1 Sanitary Duties

1 Water Duties

R.C.A.M.C.

1 Officer

2 Orderlies

R.C.A.S.C.

1 Officer

1 N.C.O.

(Recce party for future maintainance project)

Air

One Squadron

(Bomber recce)

(To maintain a flight of five aircraft continuously until no longer required).

4. Objectives

St. Pierre

Military:

(a) W/T Transmitting Station near resevoir.

(b) Administrative area bordering on Government wharf, inner harbour,
containing:

Administrative offices & Government

House

Police Station

Customs House

Post Office

(c) Cable Relay Station.

(d) Power Plant

(e) Telephone Exchange

(f) Cable Landing (Ravenal Bay)

NOTE:

If the 4" gun, which is reported to be mounted at Cape Aigle is found to be manned, this will form a special objective to be decided by the Commander on the spot.

Naval

Coal Wharf

Armd Trawler

Air

Sorties (recce unless called upon for other operations)

Miquelon

As the situation is assessed by the Commander.

5. Arrangements for Embarkation.

Force assembles at Sydney. Zero minus (?) day. Load on the ships as per Commander's plan.

6. Arrangements for Disembarkation.

Naval:

B.M. and Dock Party

Military:

Dock Party to be arranged with B.M.

7. Action First Flight.

Signal for landing to be decided by Commander, following consultation with Senior Naval Officer.

Strength—to be decided by Commander.

Task:

- (a) To proceed as quickly as possible with mobile detachment to Administrative Offices and Government House, (Ensure no documents destroyed), W/T Station and Cable Relay Station.
- (b) To occupy as soon as practicable Administrative area bordering on the Government wharf, which contains police station, customs house and post office.
- (c) Following which the power plant, telephone exchange and cable landing (Ravenal Bay) will have to be investigated with a view to ascertaining the necessity or otherwise, of occupying.

8. Action Subsequent Flight, or Flights.

Signal for landing decided by the Commander.

Strength to be decided by the Commander.

Assembly position to be decided by the Commander.

Force H.Q. to be decided by the Commander.

9. Orders for Air Reconnaissance.

To be such that a last and first light sortie is made and reports rendered to the Naval Commander. A flight of approximately 5 planes will afford coverage with wireless inter-communication to Force H.Q.

10. Administration

Dress and Equipment:

As per Mob. Store Tables, but Tommy Guns to be provided for the motorcycle detachment (as per para 3 above).

Transport:

5 Motorcycle combinations

3 Motorcycle combinations (Signals).

Supplies:

30 days reserve and 7 days partially fresh.

R.C.A.S.C. reconnaissance detachment will render report as soon as possible as to conditions for subsequent maintenance.

Water:

Local supply, (provided usual precautions are taken) supplemented by a ship's supply covering an emergency. An early report to be rendered by Force H.Q. in this matter.

Ammunition:

Normal scale on the man and with the gun. The infantry coy, will also carry a proportion of the battalion reserve as decided by the Commander.

Medical:

Detachments of the force will handle shore casualties, evacuation being made to Naval craft. An early report on shore facilities will be rendered by Force H.Q. covering future maintenance.

Provost: & Internal Security Measures

Fireworks:

Sufficient to be supplied to enable Force Commanders to arrange rocket and flare signals.

11. Inter-communication.

(a) Generally:

Synchronization of watches by Signal from Naval Commander.

Position of headquarters remains with Naval Commander on Destroyer, until Military Commander makes decision to land.

Reports: Force Commander, through Naval facilities, will ensure full reports on the –progress of the operation are rendered to Joint Operations Room, Atlantic Command, Halifax,

Allotment of RCAF W/T detachment to be arranged by Commander of Force and Air authorities. W/T frequencies, call signs, and code names – to be drawn up in appendix form, after consultation between the three Services.

(b) During Operation.

- (i) Between Force H.Q. on shore and Infantry detachments by Unit Signals.
- (ii) Between Force H.Q. on shore and Naval H.Q. afloat, detachment of R.C. Sigs.
- (iii) Between Navy and Air and Army and Air to be supplied by R.C.A.F. W/T detachment.
- (iv) Between Force H.Q. and any detachment occupying town of Miquelon, detachment R.C. Sigs.
- (v) Detachment, R.C. Sigs. Will maintain W/T station, cable and relay station, St. Pierre. This detachment will also investigate question of operation this station with Halifax or Sydney.

(c) Zero Day -- to be notified separately.

11th June, 1941,

Halifax, N.S.

(L.C. Goodeve)

Colonel G.S.

Secretary, Joint Service Committee Atlantic

Coast.

APPENDIX ``B``

20TH August 20th, 1941

THE LAKE SUPERIOR REGIMENT OPERATION INSTRUCTION

NO. 1

ATLANTIC COMMAND TEST EXERCISE ``Q``

Ref. Map	CHARLOTTETOWN-SYDNEY	8 Mi. to 1 Inch
	SYDNEY SHEET	1 Mi. to 1 Inch

1. TROOPS ``Q`` Force Lake Sup. R. – APPENDIX ``A``, and
DETACHMENT (12 vehicles #2 Troop Carrying
Coy., R.C.O.C.)

2. TASKS To move to Sydney to attack and destroy an
invading enemy.

3. DEGREE OF READINESS ``Q`Force will be placed on 4 hours notice on receipt of ``STAND TO``. This notice may be shortened by VOL HOURS. CODE word ``VOL`` relates to length of notice to move.

4. ROUTE S.P. Route and T.C.P. (see trace ``A``)

5. ORDER OF MARCH See Appendix ``B``

6. TIME Zero hour will refer to the time the leading vehicle crosses S.P.

7. TRAFFIC CONTROL Grey and Simcoe Foresters will provide Traffic Control personnel under Bde. Arrangements.

8. SYDNEY GUIDE M/C traffic guides will pick up both ``A`` and ``B`` Echelons at SYDNEY RIVER, Rd. JUNCTION 693513 SYDNEY SHEET 1/63360 and guide convoy to Destination. M/C traffic guides will be supplied.

9. FERRY Crossing CANSO STRAITS will be carried out under arrangements of ATLANTIC COMMAND STAFF OFFICER in charge FERRY OPERATIONS, Lieut. C.N. McAvity. Regular commercial ferry will be used.

10. PETROL P.P.'s will be established at MULGRAVE and HAWKESBURY under arrangements with M.D. #6
11. DRESS BATTLE DRESS—BATTLE ORDER
12. RATIONS ``Q`` Force will move from Debert with unexpired portion of day's rations and one day's preserved rations for ``Q`` Force, plus increments to be attached. 250 rations to be supplied by Railhead Supply Officer.
13. AMMUNITION
- (a) 50 rounds per rifle and 12 rounds per pistol on the man.
 - (c) 1,000 rounds per L.M.G. with gun.
 - (d) 10,000 rounds .303 boxed unit reserve.
 - (e) 10,000 rounds per Tommy Gun. 100 rounds per gun unit reserve.
14. TRANSPORT Unit transport will be used. Any M/C combination or vehicles not available or unserviceable to be replaced by Camp Ordnance Officer.
15. GREATCOATS Greatcoats will be carried by each man.

16. WATER Water bottles will be filled and spare water carried in cookers.
17. COOKERS Carrying crates will be made for cookers.
18. COMMUNICA
TION H.Q. 11th. Canadian Infantry Brigade will remain in Debert. Operation messages may Be send by civilian telephone. Code names Will be used. (see appendix ``C``). All Messages will be prefaced with the prefix ``TEST OPERATION`` repeat ``TEST OPERATION``.
19. ACKNOWLEDGE

Sgd H. Cook

(H. Cook) Lieut. Col.

Commanding Officer,

``Q`` Force, Lake Sup. R.

DISTRIBUTION

Copy No. 1	11 th . Cdn. Inf. Bde.
Copy No. 2	O.C. ``C`` Coy., Lake Sup. R.
Copy No. 3	O.C. ``HQ`` Coy., Lake Sup. R.
Copy No. 4	FILE
Copy No. 5)	
Copy No. 6)	WAR DIARY

APPENDIX ``A``

LAKE SUP. R. OPERATION INSTRUCTIONS #1 (cont`d)

ATLANTIC COMMAND TEST EXERCISE ``Q``

Force Headquarters	Lieut.-Col H. Cook Commanding
Adjutant	Lieut. R.D. MacKenzie
I.O.	Lieut. W. Cargo
Clerks	2 O/R
Police	3 O/R
Medical N.C.O. & S.B`s	5 O/R

``C`` COMPANY (COMPLETE WAR ESTABLISHMENT 5 OFFICERS 122 O/R)

#1 Platoon	1 N.C.O.
	4 Signallers
	2 Orderlies (2 bicycles)

Platoon

Lieut. Macgillivray

1 N.C.O.

8 O/R 5 (M/C`s)

#5 Platoon

1 N.C.O.

2 O/R (Pionners)

#6 Platoon

4 O/R (Cooks)

1 O/R (Sanitary Duty)

1 O/R (Water Duty)

APPENDIX "B"

LAKE SUP. R OPERATION INSTRUCTION #1 (cont'd)

ATLANTIC COMMAND TEST EXERCISE "Q"

"A"

ORDER OF MARCH

"A" Echelon

Vehicles

(1) 3 M/C combinations	
(2) 1 Pl. "Q" Force	1/15 cwt. – Pl. Truck 2-T.C.V's.
(3) Force Command Staff	1-Staff Car
Bn. Clerks	1-Station Wagon
(4) Remainder of "Q" Force	1-8 cwt 1-15 " 8-T. C.V's 2-30 cwt. Cookers & Stores
(5) 2 M/C combinations	
TOTAL VEHICLES "A" ECHELON	<hr/> 17

``B`` Echelon

(6) Spare Vehicles	2-T.C. V`s
	1-30 cwt
	2-15 ``
(7) Medicals	1-15 cwt.

TOTAL VEHICLES ``B`` ECHELON	6

``B``

MOVEMENT

1. 20 V.T.M.
2. 20 M.I.H.
3. Space between Echelons ---300 yds
4. No halts unless ordered.

APPENDIX ``C`

LAKE SUP. R OPERATION INSTRUCTION #1 (concl)

ATLANTIC COMMAND TEST EXERCISE ``Q``

H.Q. Atlantic Command	ALTO
Sydney Command	GAMO
H.Q. 11 Cdn. Inf. Bde.	DAMO
Ferry Officer	FORO
``Q`` Forces	CABO

VEHICLE	VEBO
M/C	MOCO
MAN	MONO

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174. Ibid: Minutes of Meeting of Naval Staff, 31 Dec 42.
175. (Air) HQS 15-24-4: Pick to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 27 Nov 42.
176. Ibid: “Minutes of 197th Meeting of Chiefs of Staff Committee held on Tuesday, 22nd December, 1942”.

177. Ibid: “Extract of Minutes of Meeting of Defence Council held on Friday, January 8th, 1943”.
178. Ibid: Hanna to D.A.M.A.S., 12 Feb 43.
179. Ibid: Jemmett to Secretary, Naval Board, 10 Feb 43.
180. Ibid: Breadner to the Minister, 2 Mar 43.
181. Ibid: Power to C.A.S., 2 Mar 43; Gough to C.A.S. 20 May 43; Keenleyside to Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air, 18 Jun 43.
182. Ibid: Jemmett to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 12 June 43.
183. Ibid: Hockenberry to Anderson, 21 Jun 43.
184. W.D., Maj-Gen. M.A. Pope: 10 Jun 43.
185. (Air) HQS 15-24-4: Cypher No. 21, Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting Canadian Consul, St. Pierre and Miquelon, 7 Jul 43; de Carteret to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 23 Jun 43.
186. The Ottawa Journal, 29 Sep 58.